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Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death
Daryl Lim

Abstract
Copyright litigation involving hit songs like Robin Thicke’s “Blurred
Lines,” Justin Bieber and Usher’s “Somebody to Love,” and Led Zeppelin’s
“Stairway to Heaven” caused many in the music industry to vex over the line
between homage and infringement. When are the two works too similar? To
many courts and scholars, substantial similarity is “bizarre,” “ad hoc,” and
“a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence.” Every creative work
borrows some inspiration from other works, whether copyrighted or not.
Judging when defendants appropriated too much is an inherently opaque and
subjective enterprise, but unraveling its mysteries is critical for the flourishing
of diverse, creative ecosystems like architecture, literature, movies, and
software.
The scholarly debate has focused on doctrinal tests and litigation venues
without accounting for factors actually impacting case outcomes and those
that do not. Unaddressed, plaintiffs will continue to face abysmal odds
without really knowing why. This Article reveals potentially malignant
features in copyright law that may inhibit the growth of creativity and
technology, and other features that are conventionally thought to impact case
outcomes but are surprisingly irrelevant. This Article’s most important
finding is substantial similarity’s silent death through pretrial motions and
the prevalence of non-rival defendants. This Article also uncovers the
irrelevance of willful infringement and the nature of the copyrighted works at
issue to case outcomes. Beyond copyright law, this Article underscores the
consequences of shunting jury trials, affirms how empirical research realigns
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Intellectual Property, Information and Privacy Law,
The University of Illinois at Chicago John Marshall Law School. I am grateful to Ann Bartow, Chris
Carani, Josh Sarnoff, Sam Wang, and Peter Yu for their valuable insights. My appreciation also goes
out to Zachary Carstens, Joseph Ramli, Reed Bartley, and Amanda Sansone of the Pepperdine Law
Review for their excellent editorial work. UIC John Marshall Law School’s summer research stipend
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theoretical work to real-world outcomes, and demonstrates how crossfertilization within copyright doctrines and beyond copyright law is critical to
addressing seemingly intractable doctrinal puzzles like substantial similarity.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since a federal jury decided Robin Thicke’s hit song “Blurred Lines”
copied Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give it Up” several years ago, the music
industry has vexed over the line between homage and infringement.1 So when
the en banc Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Skidmore v. Zeppelin
recently made it harder for plaintiffs to prove infringement, many heaved a
sigh of relief.2 A band called Spirit accused rock legend Led Zeppelin of
infringement through Zeppelin’s song, “Stairway to Heaven,” which shared a
similar chord sequence and also had a bass line that descended along a
chromatic scale.3 In upholding the jury’s verdict that there was no substantial
similarity, the Ninth Circuit explained that works with generic or
commonplace elements were protected by minimal or “thin” copyright, and
plaintiffs had to show that the two works were virtually identical to succeed.4
Substantial similarity is the fulcrum of copyright law and its complexity
rivals copyright law’s fair use defense which permits otherwise infringing
uses of the copyrighted work.5 As a heuristic, substantial similarity plays a
critical role in tailoring the scope of copyright protection in a vast majority of
cases that involve nonliteral copying.6 Separate from whether copying exists
as a factual matter, courts need to determine whether impermissible copying
1. See Ben Sisario, The ‘Blurred Lines’ Case Scared Songwriters. But Its Time May Be Up, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/arts/music/blurred-lines-led-zeppelincopyright.html (reporting that “the music industry has been in an anxious state about copyright”).
2. See id.
3. Skidmore ex rel. Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1056–58 (9th Cir.
2020).
4. Id. at 1076 n.13.
5. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement
Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2016) (“The complexity of the modern copyright infringement
analysis cannot be overstated. Often referred to as the “substantial similarity” requirement, its
structure, scope, and purpose continue to confound courts and scholars—perhaps even more so (and
more routinely) than the infamous fair use doctrine.”); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A) (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2015) (recognizing it as “one
of the most difficult questions in copyright law”); Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for
Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2013) (describing it as a “central
puzzle for U.S. copyright law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries”); Lydia Pallas Loren & R.
Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement: Burdens of Proof in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 621, 646 (2019) (“The inquiry into substantial similarity is, in some ways,
the heart of many infringement cases.”).
6. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 288–89 (2014)
(describing it as “an essential component of almost all copyright infringement actions that do not
involve outright copying by a defendant”).
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took place by identifying misappropriated, colorable variations of the
original.7
Despite division among circuits over substantial similarity tests, the
Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue.8 The result is a patchwork of
rhetoric resting on confusing generalizations that ultimately translate into “I’ll
know it when I see it” determinations.9 To make matters worse, courts must
apply these tests across a diverse set of industries.10 Judges and scholars have
called those tests “ad hoc,”11 “bizarre,”12 and “a virtual black hole in copyright
jurisprudence.”13 The debate has gone on for decades, and there is no end in
sight.14
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. See Michael L. Sharb, Getting a “Total Concept and Feel” of Copyright Infringement, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 903, 903 (1993); see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 5, at § 13.03[A] (“The determination
of the extent of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and hence infringing, similarity presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is the least susceptible of helpful
generalizations.”); Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U.L. REV.
681, 682 (2016) (“[S]ubstantial similarity, copyright law’s core infringement inquiry, is a mess. Once
the law allows that non-exact copies are actionable, courts need some method to determine when two
works are so alike that one should be deemed an actionable infringement of the other.”); Jarrod M.
Mohler, Toward a Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 972 (2000) (describing the “indeterminacy and misapplication of tests for
copyright infringement”).
10. See Sharb, supra note 9, at 904 (arguing that “the ad hoc nature of copyright infringement”
requires a flexible test, and “[y]et, there must be a common structure in order for the courts, as in other
areas of the law, to build an underlying body of substantive common law”). See Samuelson, supra
note 5, at 1821 (arguing for courts “to tailor infringement analysis based on the nature of the works at
issue”); see also Nicole Lieberman, Un-Blurring Substantial Similarity: Aesthetic Judgments and
Romantic Authorship in Music Copyright Law, 6 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 91, 93 (2016)
(“[C]ourts have crafted an impressionistic doctrine that has drifted far from copyright’s original
economic purpose of incentivizing creation.”).
11. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.1960) (Learned
Hand, J.).
12. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010).
13. Balganesh, supra note 5, at 794; see also Samuelson, supra note 5, at 1823 (arguing that each
of these tests is flawed and that courts have generally failed to provide clear guidance about which test
to apply in which kinds of cases); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 716–19 (2012) (critiquing tests).
14. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE
L.J. 203, 214 (2012) (“[v]iewing substantial similarity as a mechanism of conceptually . . . sequencing
incommensurable values in copyright law” and informing a “more coherent framework for the fairuse doctrine”); Hickey, supra note 9, at 681 (arguing “courts should adopt a flexible, contextual
approach to framing”); Daniel Gervais, Improper Appropriation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 600
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Unlike patent law where courts can rely on claims to delineate the
boundaries of their plaintiff’s property rights, substantial similarity’s
indefiniteness gives rise to no more than “the right to hire a lawyer.”15
Lawyers cannot effectively evaluate claims of infringement they receive.16
This indeterminacy is troubling. Blindly navigating the morass of case law
on substantial similarity without understanding its contours risks defeating the
purpose of copyright law itself.17 Failing to understand how substantial
similarity works prevents courts and scholars from clearly outlining the
necessary components to plaintiffs’ evidence in infringement cases, and
obscures the standards courts should identify in the cases before them.18 This
may result in false positives and chill efforts by rivals as well as those in
ancillary markets from developing non-infringing works, and even cause them
to abandon their efforts if they cannot afford to face those unnecessarily
heightened risks.19
The stakes in getting the law on substantial similarity right are high. In
2017, copyright industries in the United States contributed over one trillion

(2019) (suggesting that “propriety should play an enhanced role . . . in cases of reuse of pre-existing
copyrighted works”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990) (noting
that substantial similarity is “largely subjective, thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its
intuitive judgment of the perceived equities in a case”); Katherine Lippman, Comment, The Beginning
of the End: Preliminary Results of an Empirical Study of Copyright Substantial Similarity Opinions
in the U.S. Circuit Courts, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 541 (2013) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the
substantial similarity doctrine has perplexed students, scholars, and courts for decades.”).
15. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (referring to fair use).
16. See Robert F. Helfing, Substantial Similarity and Junk Science: Reconstructing the Test of
Copyright Infringement, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 735, 737 (2020) (“The
elusive standard frustrates the effective evaluation of claims by lawyers, generating unnecessary
litigation.”); see also Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1375 (2007) (“The
improper appropriation analysis, for both courts and litigants, is one of the most contentious and least
precisely defined inquires in copyright law.”).
17. See Helfing, supra note 16, at 737 (“It also produces legal decisions that defeat the purposes
of copyright law more often than should be tolerated.”).
18. See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths
in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1990) (arguing that a correct perception
of the nature of similarity is necessary to “clarify the elements of proof required in copyright
infringement cases, the variety of methods available to establish those elements and the proper
standards for appellate review of infringement issues”).
19. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1387 (2015)
(describing the “added layer of perniciousness” of overclaiming stemming from uncertain copyright
scope for downstream creators and concluding that clarity “may not only decrease constraint’s costs
but also increase its benefits”).
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dollars to the gross domestic product, accounted for almost seven percent of
the United States economy, and employed nearly six million workers,
comprising about four percent of the entire workforce in the United States.20
In 2018, litigants filed nearly six thousand copyright infringement cases, an
increase of three times the number of cases from a decade ago.21 On average,
copyright cases cost between four hundred thousand to two million dollars to
litigate.22
More commentary on leading cases alone will fail to drive meaningful
reform without an evidence-based understanding of how they applied
substantial similarity.23 The root problem here is that judging substantial
similarity requires significant factual and values-based judgments. Cast adrift
on an ocean without clear legal standards, those judgments are theory-less and
standard-less. Judges, scholars, and practitioners lack the insight to fix
substantial similarity because many of its most important facets can only be
uncovered empirically.24 Every case is fact specific, eliding rote application
of formulaic or mechanistic rules.25 An evidence-based response can be given
to assertions and challenges to conventional wisdom only by stepping back to
see how the pieces from many cases fit together.
20. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2018 REPORT 5,
6, 10–11 (2018), https://iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/12/2018CpyrtRptFull.pdf.
21. See Just the Facts: Intellectual Property Cases—Patent, Copyright, and Trademark, UNITED
STATES COURTS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/02/13/just-facts-intellectualproperty-cases-patent-copyright-and-trademark#figures_map.
22. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS’N, 2019 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2006); TOD
I. ZUCKERMAN, ROBERT D. CHESLER & CHRISTOPHER KEEGAN, ASSETS & FINANCE: INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & CYBER CLAIMS § 1:6 (2011).
23. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305 (8th Cir. 1984) (referring to important
considerations of judicial economy and “our interest in protecting the settled expectations of parties
who have conformed their conduct to our guidelines”); Carmania Corp., N.V. v. Hambrecht Terrell
Int’l, 705 F. Supp. 936, 939 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that it is desirable to “protect settled
expectations and thereby reduce the parties’ costs of doing business”). For earlier work employing
empirical methods, see DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND
POLICY PERSPECTIVES (2013) [hereinafter LIM, EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES];
Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 299 (2014) [hereinafter Lim, Rebirth or False Dawn?]; Daryl Lim, I Dissent: The Federal
Circuit’s “Great Dissenter,” Her Influence on the Patent Dialogue, and Why It Matters, 19 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 873 (2017) [hereinafter Lim, The Federal Circuit’s “Great Dissenter”].
24. See ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT
LAW, at xxi (2012) (“[T]here lacks a systematic and thorough account of substantial similarity case
law that would guide how the boundaries of copyright infringement ought to be fixed, if at all.”).
25. See Sharb, supra note 9, at 904 (“The cases are riddled with confusion, inconsistency, and lack
of uniformity in their application of infringement concepts.”).
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This Article presents the first and only modern empirical analysis of
substantial similarity. Its most important finding is that the scholarly criticism
of substantiality similarity’s confounding tests applied disparately across
circuit courts has blinded us to its silent death.26 Plaintiffs struggle to prove
copyright infringement in a way never observed and usually fail before they
reach jury trials. Compared to patent plaintiffs, copyright plaintiffs do
abysmally.27 This Article identifies two culprits.
First, judges and defendants use pretrial motions to ride roughshod over
substantial similarity tests reserved for juries. Some judges tout expertise and
efficiency to justify this, but this Article rebuts both assertions.28 Second,
many cases involve non-rival defendants and like defendants invoking fair
use, and courts may regard these defendants as promoting, rather than stifling,
copyright’s utilitarian policies by producing precisely the kind of works of
authorship that copyright law is meant to encourage.
This Article also shows that unlike in trademark infringement cases,
courts are unmoved by allegations of willful infringement when dealing with
substantial similarity.29 Moreover, earlier debates over the impact of the type
of work on plaintiff outcomes deserve reconsideration. There is a general
homogeneity across all types of work, and a trend favoring defendants.30
Cumulatively, these evidence-based findings will help scholars develop a
framework to better understand not just copyright infringement, but also other
areas of the law as well.
Part II of this Article describes the confusing patchwork of substantial
similarity law, and the challenging task fact finders undertake in every case.
Part III sketches the empirical study design as well as its limits. It explains
the case content analysis method and situates the original dataset comprising

26. See infra Section IV.A. The complexity of copyright litigation makes it difficult to generalize,
from even a study covering hundreds of cases. For instance, circumstances such as a particular judge
or jury may cause a case to settle where the same case before another judge or jury could proceed to
an appeal. This Article focuses on how appellate and lower courts interpret precedent. Those
interpretations are not uniform and can never be so. See infra Section III.B.2.
27. See infra Section IV.A. The point of comparison should not be taken too far. Courts employ
substantial similarity because there is no literal claim to deductively apply their legal analysis.
Moreover, the methods of non-literal similarity judgments differ between the doctrine of equivalents’
tests and the three substantial similarity tests. In particular, the latter lacks the thresholds that claim
construction provides. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.
28. See infra Section IV.B.
29. See infra Section IV.C.
30. See infra Section IV.D.
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twenty-two variables and over four thousand datapoints in the context of that
well-established methodology.31 Part III concludes by mentioning limitations
to the database and statistics, as well as limits on the dynamics of litigation in
order to provide a realistic view of what this Article seeks to achieve.
Part IV reports on substantial similarity’s silent death. It looks beyond
the clamor of scholarly debate over the confusing tests and circuit variations
to reveal a surprising partnership between judges and defendants, the
relevance of non-rivals and irrelevance of willful infringement, and the
generally uniform outcomes revealed by the diverse array of works of
authorship captured in the dataset.
This Article concludes by highlighting key takeaways and identifying
promising avenues for further research. Beyond copyright law, this Article
underscores the consequences of shunting jury trials, affirms how empirical
research realigns theoretical work to real-world outcomes, and demonstrates
how cross-fertilization within copyright doctrines and beyond copyright law
is critical to addressing seemingly intractable doctrinal puzzles like substantial
similarity.
II. JUDGING SIMILARITY
Congress has the constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” to
benefit the public.32 Through the Copyright Act, authors of “original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” may obtain
protection for limited duration.33 They must contain “at least some minimal
degree of creativity,” but “even a slight amount will suffice.”34 Most works
make the grade as they possess some creative spark, “no matter how crude,
humble or obvious it might be.”35 These “works of authorship” encompass
literary, architectural, pictorial, sculptural, and graphic works.36 Authors
31. See infra note 145 (containing link to access dataset).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016); see also Roodhuyzen, supra note 16, at 1379 (“[T]he Act specifies
in detail the kinds of works that are protected and for how long; creates protection even without
registration or notice; assigns exclusive rights and allows for transfer and division of ownership and
rights; and creates various remedies including damages and fines.”).
34. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
35. Id. (quotations omitted).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).
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enjoy a bundle of rights to reproduce their work, prepare derivative works,
distribute, public perform, and display their work.37 To enforce these rights,
the Copyright Act empowers copyright owners to sue for infringement.38
Unfortunately, neither the Act nor its legislative history explains what
plaintiffs must show. Courts therefore devised the rule that plaintiffs must
prove both that they have a valid copyright in the work and that the defendant
wrongfully copied from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.39 Substantial
similarity’s foundation as an ad hoc doctrine finds its origin here.40
Judging substantial similarity can be daunting because the fact finder
must distinguish copyrightable expression from unprotected factual
description without the linguistic aids like those found in patent claims.41 The
doctrinal patchwork of rules juxtaposed on a factually intensive inquiry
produces a morass of unclear precedent almost by default. Part II situates this
ad hoc doctrine within an otherwise intricately crafted statutory framework in
the Copyright Act.42 After laying out the elements of infringement, the third
Part reviews the various tests circuit courts devised to answer the substantial
similarity inquiry, and concludes with the limits courts placed on substantial
similarity to protect defendants and the public’s right to enjoy
uncopyrightable material.43
The plaintiff must show the defendant copied material from the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work rather than creating it or copying it from another source,
and that the defendant copied enough copyrighted material from the plaintiff’s
work. The plaintiff’s first task is to prove actual copying, and do so using
direct or indirect evidence.44 While showing that the defendant directly
copied the work verbatim seems the most obvious method to do so, direct

37. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2016) (“[A]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”).
39. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
40. Id.
41. See infra Section IV.B.
42. See infra Section II.A.
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. See ERIC OSTERBERG, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION: ANALYZING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY,
PRACTICE NOTE 5-524-1501 (2020), Thomson Reuters Practical Law, https://ca.practicallaw.
thomsonreuters.com/5-524-1501?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true
&OWSessionId=47d232b8b21f43f290610ca34b2c0913&skipAnonymous=true (noting that types of
direct proof of actual copying include admissions, eyewitness testimony, the presence of watermarks,
or other features in the defendant’s work conclusively identifying the plaintiff’s work as the source).
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proof of actual copying is actually very rare.45 Eyewitnesses are hard to come
by and it is even harder to find alleged infringers who voluntarily confess.46
This explains why substantial similarity plays such an outsized role in
copyright infringement.47
Without evidence of direct copying, “striking similarity” is the first way
for owners to show actual copying through indirect evidence.48 Striking
similarity is a likeness between works so exact it cannot be explained other
than by copying, creating an inference of actual copying or of access to the
plaintiff’s work.49 The second way plaintiffs can prove actual copying by
indirect evidence is through circumstantial evidence of access paired with
“probative similarity.” This second way requires plaintiffs to show the
defendant had a reasonable possibility of accessing their work and that
similarities between the works are probative of actual copying.50 Courts
sometimes confuse probative similarity (which looks to the defendant’s
actions for evidence of copying) with substantial similarity (which looks to
the works themselves to see if the amount copied was permissible).51
A plaintiff might prove the defendant had access through widespread
dissemination of the plaintiff’s work52 or if the plaintiff sent the work to the

45. See Howard Root, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the
Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1275–76 (1984) (“Because pirates are unlikely to
be obvious about their copying, proof of the direct use of the copyrighted work in preparing a copy is
virtually impossible.”).
46. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL’S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976
ACT 161 (5th Ed. 1979).
47. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 13.01[B], at 13-11 to 13-12 (“It is generally not possible to
establish copying . . . by direct evidence as it is rare that the plaintiff has available a witness to the
physical act of copying. . . . Therefore, copying is ordinarily established indirectly by the plaintiff’s
proof of access and ‘substantial’ similarity.”).
48. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“Striking similarity” indicates that “the
similarities [between the two works] must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and
defendant” created the works independently.). Courts consider the similarities’ quirks, including
mistakes or idiosyncrasies attributed to copying. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132
F.3d 1167, 1170–71 (7th Cir. 1997); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471–72 (2d Cir. 1995).
49. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Malibu Textiles, Inc. v.
Label Lane Int’l, Inc., 922 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2019).
50. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that speculative
possibility of access is insufficient).
51. See Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2018).
52. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) (deeming
that defendant had access to the number one song because defendant may have heard it almost
anywhere).
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defendant to review.53 As with striking similarity, the plaintiff can show
similar uses of public domain material or errors in the defendant’s work that
would be unexpected without copying.54 Some courts endorse a sliding scale
approach, called the “inverse ratio rule,” where “stronger evidence of access
requires less evidence of probative similarity.”55 In Skidmore, the Ninth
Circuit recently joined other circuits in clarifying the rule did not apply to
substantial similarity.56 It noted that the majority of other circuits (the Second,
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits) declined to adopt the rule.57 Skidmore
criticized the rule as being illogical, as complete access should not preclude
the need for plaintiffs to show similarity, and as the rule provides an unfair
advantage to those with more accessible works.58
Post-Skidmore, it remains uncertain, however, whether and to what extent
the inverse ratio rule lives on in the actual copying limb of the copyright
infringement inquiry. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[b]y rejecting the inverse
ratio rule, we are not suggesting that access cannot serve as circumstantial
evidence of actual copying in all cases.”59 This suggests that access and
probative similarity can still prove that actual copying occurred. Skidmore
appears to leave intact the line of cases holding that striking similarity can
constitute actual copying even with limited evidence of access.60 In any case,
plaintiffs who prove actual copying will still need to prove substantial
similarity, a challenge which courts have complained of being “vague” and

53. See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2001).
54. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); L.A. Printex
Indus. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2012).
55. OSTERBERG, supra note 44.
56. See Skidmore ex rel. Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir.
2020); see also Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (criticizing and declining to apply
the inverse ratio rule).
57. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1066.
58. Id. at 1068 (“[T]he inverse ratio rule unfairly advantages those whose work is most accessible
by lowering the standard of proof for [probative] similarity.”). The court noted that access can be
established readily in cases when the plaintiff’s work is available on YouTube, Netflix, Hulu, Amazon,
Spotify, Pandora, and other platforms. Id.
59. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1069.
60. See id. at 1064 (holding that a plaintiff can provide sufficient evidence of actual copying by
showing that the two works share a striking similarity, which illustrates that “the similarities between
the two works are due to ‘copying rather than . . . coincidence, independent creation, or prior common
source’” (quoting Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1052 (C.D.
Cal. 2010))).

724

[Vol. 48: 713, 2021]

Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

“arbitrary.”61
The substantial similarity inquiry seeks to determine whether two works
share such similar copyrightable expression that one infringes upon the other.
The inquiry rests on the nature of the alleged infringement, the court’s
substantial similarity test, and the limits to substantial similarity—whether the
defendant copied unprotectable content as well as the amount and importance
of material that the defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work.62
The problem is that protectable elements of any work can be dissected to
a point where nothing remains but its own unprotectable parts, and case law
provides little indication of where to stop in the reductionist analysis.63 The
Second Circuit noted that “there can be no originality in a painting because all
colors of paint have been used somewhere in the past.”64 It follows that just
as originality can be found in every allegedly unoriginal work, unoriginality
can be found in almost every original work.65 How much originality will
convince a court is inherently uncertain, so what constitutes infringement
becomes a crapshoot as well.66 The difficulty of this task may help explain
why judges, believing in their expertise and efficiency, ultimately decided to
wrest the substantial similarity inquiry from lay jurors, as will be seen in

61. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (stating that “the test
for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague”); see also Nichols v. Univ. Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining that drawing the line between what is protected and what is
not “will seem arbitrary, [but] that is no excuse for not drawing it”); Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film, Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2004); Country Kids ‘N City Slicks,
Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996).
62. See, e.g., Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120–21 (copying plot elements and characters from a play into a
motion picture). This could also include copying computer code from the plaintiff’s copyrighted
software or a sample of musical recording. OSTERBERG, supra note 44 (listing musical recordings and
computer code as examples of “fragmented literal similarity,” where a defendant has exactly copied a
portion of plaintiff’s work).
63. See Helfing, supra note 16, at 740 (“By considering only elements deemed protectable at an
arbitrary level of dissection, courts fail to reliably identify the similar content that they evaluate for
protectability.”).
64. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1995); see Apple Comput.,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. Cf. Apple Comput., 35 F.3d at 1446 (discussing how courts will compare two works and
remove all similarities to determine the originality of a work; in this way, courts may even find some
similarities in otherwise largely original works).
66. 4 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 13.03[A] (“[T]he test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity
vague.”); see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that this inquiry “is primarily a qualitative rather than a purely quantitative analysis and must
be performed on a case-by-case basis”).
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Section IV.B.67
A. Tests for Substantial Similarity
Courts employ three main tests or some combination: the ordinary
observer
test,
the
“extrinsic/intrinsic”
test,
and
the
“abstraction/filtration/comparison” test.68 Most either adopt the Second
Circuit’s ordinary observer test or the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic test.69
A few adopt an abstraction/filtration/comparison test or variations of these
tests.70 All three tests attempt to compare protectable elements in the
copyrighted work.71
1. The Ordinary Observer Test
The Second Circuit’s ordinary observer test has the longest vintage of the
three, and finds its roots in Arnstein v. Porter.72 Composer Ira Arnstein sued
Cole Porter for infringement of copies of his songs.73 “These ranged from the
sale of a million copies to a copy kept in [Arnstein’s] room that had been
ransacked on several occasions in ‘burglaries’ with which defendant ‘could
have’ had something to do.”74 There was no direct evidence Porter had ever
seen or heard Arnstein’s compositions.75
Arnstein made two key contributions. The first contribution was
“improper appropriation,” which courts eventually renamed “substantial
similarity.”76 The ordinary observer test attempts to compare the two works
from the perspective of a hypothetical, average lay observer, and focuses on
similarities between the works and not on their differences.77 This is because

67. See infra Section IV.B.
68. Hickey, supra note 9, at 699 (“A better (though still imperfect) comparison looks to the results
under the three main tests: the observer, extrinsic/intrinsic, and A/F/C tests.”).
69. See infra Section IV.A.
70. See infra Section IV.A.
71. See Helfing, supra note 16, at 739–40.
72. Latman, supra note 18, at 1191 (“One may, in tracing the history of the proof of infringement,
justifiably start with the legendary Arnstein v. Porter.”).
73. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946).
74. Latman, supra note 18, at 1191.
75. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
76. Latman, supra note 18, at 1192.
77. Id.
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similarities suggest defendants saw and copied the works instead of
independently creating them. The test also looks at the economic or aesthetic
value of the similarities.78 In his seminal article, Professor Alan Latman
observed that the ordinary observer test, “when properly understood, remains
the most instructive guide to proving infringement.”79 History would prove
Professor Latman correct. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits all apply some form of the ordinary observer test, and as Section IV.A
shows, the test has become the nation’s de facto test for substantial
similarity.80
Arnstein’s second contribution was the centrality of the jury in substantial
similarity inquiries. Judge Frank, writing for himself and Judge Learned
Hand, noted the appropriateness of denying summary judgment when “there
is the slightest doubt as to the facts,” and stressed the importance of in-court
cross-examination.81 Judge Clark wrote a sharp dissent that the majority was
creating “chaos, judicial as well as musical,” and upheld the propriety of
deciding the issue on summary judgment.82 As Section IV.B shows, Judge
Clark’s dissenting view took root with disastrous consequences for plaintiffs
in the decades to come.83
However, the ordinary observer test suffered from two principal defects.
First, it instructed the audience to assess similarities without specifying what
to look for. Second, it provided no guidance on similarities in uncopyrightable
elements. The Second Circuit subsequently refined its test to include a “more
discerning ordinary observer” capable of filtering out unprotectable elements,
such as elements taken from the public domain.84 Like nature, the law abhors
a vacuum, and by then, circuit courts across the country had devised
alternative tests of their own.

78. See Id. at 1199–1200.
79. Id. at 1191.
80. Roodhuyzen, supra note 16, at 1391–97, 1402–05 (stating that the First, Third, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits all use some form of the ordinary observer test, with the Fourth Circuit using a similar
test of whether “the intended audience would consider the works substantially similar”); see Dawson
v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 732–33 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that the court would compare
the works through the eyes of the intended audience, which is typically the same as the ordinary
observer because copyrighted works are usually intended for the public at large).
81. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–70 (2d Cir. 1946).
82. Id. at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting).
83. See infra Section IV.B.
84. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 265, 268–69, 271–73 (2d Cir. 2001) (considering
elements of copyrighted quilt taken from public domain).
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2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test
Long before Skidmore, the Ninth Circuit captured national attention when
it decided to reject Arnstein’s test in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.85 The court in Krofft was concerned
that “copying” and “substantial similarity” might result in liability when
defendants only took nonprotected ideas.86 It decided to introduce a two-step
procedure that would first determine whether defendants took only ideas—a
test it called “extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed” by experts if
necessary;87 and then, second, whether substantial similarity existed between
the expression—a test labeled “intrinsic” because it depends “on the response
of the ordinary reasonable person” and not on “the type of external criteria
and analysis which marks the extrinsic test.”88 Plaintiffs would win only if
they satisfied both the extrinsic and intrinsic tests, so if either favored the
defendant, there would be no infringement.89
Krofft acknowledged that “[t]his same type of bifurcated test was
announced” in Arnstein and that the “unlawful appropriation” in Arnstein’s
second prong meant simply taking protected expression rather than
unprotected ideas.90 At the same time, it declared “[w]e do not resurrect the
Arnstein approach today. Rather we formulate an extrinsic-intrinsic test for
infringement based on the idea-expression dichotomy. We believe that the
Arnstein court was doing nearly the same thing. But the fact that it may not
have been does not subtract from our analysis.”91
Professor Latman offered a way to make sense of these seemingly
contradictory statements. He explained: “Arnstein focuses on copying versus
independent production, Krofft on copying of ideas rather than copying of
expression. They slice the infringement apple from different angles.”92
However, this suggests a conflation of proving copying/access with proving

85. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164–65 (9th
Cir. 1977).
86. Id. at 1162.
87. Id. at 1164.
88. Id.
89. See Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994).
90. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
91. Id. at 1165 n.7.
92. Latman, supra note 18, at 1203.
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infringement has occurred.93 In contrast to the ordinary observer test, which
compares the works from the perspective of an ordinary observer, the
extrinsic/intrinsic test requires courts to compare the works “as a whole,”
while filtering out the unprotectable elements.
Whatever the case, the extrinsic/intrinsic test has proven difficult for
courts to apply.94 The extrinsic step’s focus on similarity in ideas is also odd
given that copyright does not protect ideas.95 Weighing in on this, Professor
Latman noted that “Krofft virtually assumes copying and therefore is much
less helpful.”96 Nonetheless, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits adopted the Ninth
Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic test, with the Fourth Circuit refining the second
step further by assuming the perspective of the “intended audience” of the
work, as opposed to the perspective of the general public, language which
seems similar to the refined ordinary observer test.97 Over a decade later, the
advent of a new technology would move the Second Circuit to once again act
to create a third test.
3. The Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison Test
The third test for substantial similarity is the abstraction/
filtration/comparison test, which the Second Circuit devised to evaluate cases
involving computer software.98 Decades after Arnstein, in Computer
Associates International v. Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit noted that while
Arnstein is useful “when the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms
readily comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay person,” the
“highly complicated and technical subject matter at the heart of [nonliteral
software] claims” called for a different approach because the internal designs
of computer programs were “likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay
observers.”99
The test first identifies elements not protected by copyright using an
93. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.
94. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 24, § 3:2.1[H] (“The application of the extrinsic test is
a somewhat unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent.”).
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea . . . .”).
96. Latman, supra note 18, at 1203.
97. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733–36 (4th Cir. 1990); see also
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 24, § 3:2.1–3:2.3.
98. Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 713.
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abstraction step—from the general idea to the precise words, images, or
sounds used in the work. The second step filters out these elements, and the
third step compares protected elements of both works.100 Each step requires
the fact finder to engage in a dissection of what is protectable and what is not,
and “expert testimony may be admissible in all three steps.”101
In Altai, a dispute arose out of two functionally similar computer
programs developed by different companies.102 The Second Circuit parsed
the software into its component parts: source and object code, parameter lists,
services required, and outlines.103 It then removed nonprotected component
parts in the public domain or if they were ideas, rather than expressions of
ideas, such as the link set in the desktop taskbar.104 Finally, the Court
compared the remaining expressive elements of the plaintiff’s program and
found no copying of protectable elements.105
William Patry criticized the abstraction/filtration/comparison test as “the
most complicated copyright ‘test’ ever conceived”106 that misses important
holistic elements of artistic works by the “brutal . . . desiccation” of elementby-element analysis.107 Others questioned its usefulness when applied to other
works of authorship.108 While most circuits reserve this test for computer
software cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reportedly apply it to all copyright
works.109
In sum, unlike typical circuit splits, circuits appear divided less by the
proper policy goals of substantial similarity, and more by the mechanics of
operationalizing those goals. Substantial similarity is not like trademark law,
where consumer confusion is addressed through a clearly warranted ordinary
100. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 710 (Once “a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed
program which are ‘ideas’ or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public
domain, there may remain a core of protectable expression. In terms of a work’s copyright value, this
is the golden nugget.”); Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir.
1996).
101. Samuelson, supra note 5, at 1838.
102. Altai, 982 F.2d at 696.
103. Id. at 706–14.
104. Id. at 707, 714–15.
105. Id. at 721.
106. William F. Patry, 3 Patry On Copyright § 9:94 (2020).
107. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:27 (2020).
108. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 698 (1999) (“[O]ne cannot divide a visual
work into neat layers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could with a text.”).
109. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 24, § 3.
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observer test; nor is substantial similarity like patent law, where the jury is
required to view the infringement through the eyes of an ordinary expert in
the field. Might copyright law not do better if it swung completely one way
or the other?110 Within a single circuit, commentators observed how courts
split on how tests should apply to different works of authorship.111 If courts
struggle to apply these tests, and if both creators and users cannot predictably
judge their legal positions, the time may now be ripe for the Supreme Court
to step in and finally introduce a nationwide test.112
B. Limits to Substantial Similarity
Copyright law encourages creativity by protecting works of authorship
but seeks to do so without allowing them to foreclose future authors from
building on that idea.113 In doing so, copyright policy seeks a balance between
competition based on public ideas and incentives to produce original work.
All works of authorship at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
ideas, so copyright law protects only sufficiently specific applications of an
idea. While protection does not “extend to any idea . . . [or] concept . . .
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work,”114 it protects the author’s original, particularized
expression of the idea.115

110. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.
111. See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 9, at 688–89 (stating that “even within a single circuit, courts
sometimes vary the test used depending on the type of work at issue (e.g., software vs. visual art)”).
112. See Roodhuyzen, supra note 16, at 1418–19. “As the tests become increasingly elusive for
both courts and litigants, it is important to consider whether there should be one single test articulated
by the Supreme Court, or rather, whether there should be a test at all.” Id. at 1377.
113. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is a
fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity. However, that law has the capacity
both to augment and diminish the prospects for creativity. By assuring the author of an original work
the exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obviously
promotes creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new works if authors are fearful that
their creations will too readily be found to be substantially similar to preexisting works.”).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016).
115. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (holding that
protection extends only to “those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp
of the [plaintiff’s] originality”); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]n looking at
. . . two works of art to determine whether they are substantially similar, focus must be on the similarity
of the expression of an idea or fact, not on the similarity of the facts, ideas or concepts themselves.”).
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Accordingly, substantial similarity excludes ideas,116 scènes à faire,117
and ideas that have limited means of expression, otherwise known as the
merger doctrine.118 Other limitations, such as the uncopyrightability of colors,
letters, and geometric forms, overlap with or are contained within these three
main categories.119 The fuzzy limits between what is protectible and
unprotectible have made substantial similarity a treacherous terrain to
navigate.
Copyright is concerned with artistic innovation and excludes protection
for a work’s utilitarian qualities. In works with a wide range of expression,
protection is “broad,” and a work will infringe if substantially similar.120 For
instance, in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the Supreme Court
created a two-prong “separability” test to determine when copyright could
cover aesthetic elements of “useful articles.”121 In the context of clothing
design elements, the Court held that aesthetic elements must be identifiable as
art when mentally separated from the article’s practical use, and qualify as
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works when expressed in any medium.122
Conversely, if there is “only a narrow range of expression,” which often
happens with factual and functional works, “copyright protection is ‘thin’ and
a work must be virtually identical to infringe” because the majority of the
work is unprotectable.123
116. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308 (explaining that “ideas, concepts, principles [and] processes” are
“in the common domain” and are “the inheritance of everyone”).
117. See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[E]lements of a
work that are ‘indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic’—like cowboys,
bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the American West—get no protection.” (quoting Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980))).
118. See Kepner–Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“[W]hen an idea can be expressed in very few ways, copyright law does not protect that expression,
because doing so would confer a de facto monopoly over the idea. In such cases idea and expression
are said to be merged.”).
119. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.
2003).
120. Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.2d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he
law is more protective of highly original and highly expressive works than it is of functional and
nonfiction works.”).
121. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1005, 1013 (2017).
122. See id. at 1004–05.
123. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Apple
Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted); see also
Yankee Candle Co. Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This heightened
showing ‘is necessary because, as idea and expression merge, fewer and fewer aspects of a work
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Basic and utilitarian aspects of a wooden doll, such as the shape of a
human body, are not copyrightable. Nor are poses which are friendly, or
aspects which aid their manufacture and adaptability.124 At the same time, the
plaintiff’s original stylistic choices qualify as protectable expression if the
choices are not dictated by the underlying idea.125 Similarly in architecture,
while there is no copyright protection for the idea of using domes, windtowers, parapets, and arches, their combination can be protected.126 Indeed,
even “selective and particularized” alterations of a public-domain carpet
pattern can be protectable expression as an “original selection” or
“arrangement.”127
Interwoven within the idea/expression dichotomy, scènes à faire, and the
merger doctrine, courts must also consider both the quantitative significance
of the copied material and the importance of the material copied in the
plaintiff’s work.128 How much qualitative and quantitative taking is informed
by the amount of the author’s original contribution? Some copyrighted works
represent significant creative effort and enjoy robust protection, whereas
others reflect only scant creativity.129
Dissimilarities may be significant if a defendant’s work takes on a
different overall concept and feel from the plaintiff’s work or has the elements
allegedly taken from the plaintiff.130 The more differences that exist between
embody a unique and creative expression of the idea; a copyright holder must then prove substantial
similarity to those few aspects of the work that are expression not required by the idea.’” (quoting Flag
Fables Inc. v. Jean Ann’s Country Flags & Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 (D. Mass. 1990))).
124. See Mattel, 616 F.3d at 916 (finding no copyright over the idea of “fashion dolls with a bratty
look or attitude, or dolls sporting trendy clothing”).
125. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that distinctive “eye
style and stitching” could qualify as protectable expression if they are “not dictated by the idea of
stuffed dinosaur dolls”).
126. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[T]o hold otherwise
would render basic architectural elements unavailable to architects generally, thus running afoul of the
very purpose of the idea/expression distinction: promoting incentives for authors to produce original
work while protecting society’s interest in the free flow of ideas.”).
127. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
128. See Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1307
(11th Cir. 2008).
129. See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he scope of copyright protection [is] a sliding scale that changes with the availability of
expressions for a given idea.”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 13.03[A][4], at 13–66.2 (“More similarity
is required when less protectible matter is at issue.”).
130. See Attia v. Soc’y of NY Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1999).
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two works, the less likely that the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s
work.131 However, dissimilarities are insignificant when they are trivial, due
to elements of the plaintiff’s work that the defendant did not copy, or merely
added to the material copied from the plaintiff.132
The amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying is the third
factor in the fair use analysis, and courts sometimes avoid a substantial
similarity analysis by finding that what the defendant copied was fair use.133
Section IV.C presents novel findings on the overlap between substantial
similarity and fair use. Where the defendant used the entire work or made an
identical copy, there is no need to compare the parties’ works in a substantial
similarity analysis.134 Where the works are similar with some expressive
elements, this general similarity in “total concept and feel” could include
defendants who copied plot elements and characters from a play into a motion
picture.135
Another scenario, known as fragmented literal similarity, arises when
defendants copy a small portion or section verbatim. This often happens with
musical recordings or computer code. The quantitative or qualitative
significance of the copied content to the defendant’s work is irrelevant.136 De
minimis copying, such as a copyrighted work appearing only fleetingly as a
background prop in a film, is non-infringing.137 However, a small quantity of
the plaintiff’s material may still be qualitatively significant and hence
infringing.138 Whether the amount of material copied is de minimis is
inherently subjective, and blends into whether something is an idea or has
merged into one, adding further to the difficulty of applying substantial
similarity in practice.

131. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980).
132. See, e.g., Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir.
1988); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (explaining that “no
plagiarist can excuse [his] wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate”).
133. See, e.g., SOFA Ent., Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 2013).
Courts also may find that the use was minimal, and therefore non-infringing. See, e.g., VMG Salsoul,
LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877–87 (9th Cir. 2016).
134. See, e.g., Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012).
135. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
136. See TufAmerica, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 67 F. Supp. 3d 590, 597–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding that it is irrelevant how often the copied portion of plaintiff’s musical recording is repeated
in the defendant’s musical recording).
137. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998).
138. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987).
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In sum, substantial similarity lacks a properly theorized standard for what
amount and what kind of copying constitutes infringement. This makes every
case essentially a value judgment by the decision maker. According to Judge
Learned Hand, “no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression[;]’ [d]ecisions
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”139 Judges, scholars, and practitioners
lack knowledge about substantial similarity because many of its most
important facets are hidden and can only be uncovered empirically. Every
case is fact specific, eliding rote application of formulaic or mechanistic rules.
Stepping back to see how the pieces from many cases fit together reveals how
standard-less judgments in individual cases are being made in practice.
III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
Judges routinely rely on a remarkably limited number of factors in
reaching their conclusions.140 They employ heuristics—such as the three
substantial similarity tests—to cut through what would otherwise be a morass
of information that could paralyze decision making entirely.141 This, however,
makes it difficult to draw broader conclusions to coherently inform future
cases.142 Scholars employ case content analysis to address this by parsing
through court decisions and studying how judges and juries apply rules to
facts.143 Section II.A presents this Article’s empirical study design using case
139. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
140. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1602 (2006) (“The data collected for this study support[s] . . . the
general hypothesis that decision makers, even when making complex decisions, consider only a small
number of factors and the more specific hypothesis that, in doing so, decision makers use a core
attributes heuristic.”).
141. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Retooling the Patent-Antitrust Intersection: Insights from Behavioral
Economics, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 124 (2017).
142. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, The (Unnoticed) Revitalization of The Doctrine of Equivalents, ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
143. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1371, 1380 (2010) [hereinafter Petherbride, On the Decline] (“Content analysis is capable of
helping scholars verify, analyze, or refute empirical claims about case law, and it is to that purpose the
approach is put in this study.”). For earlier studies where I employed a similar methodology, see Lee
Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S.
CAL L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2010); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of
Judicial Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008); LIM, EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23; Lim, Rebirth or False Dawn?, supra note 23, at 303; Daryl Lim,
Judging Equivalence, SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2020) (reporting on, inter alia,
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Section II.B states its methodological limitations and

A. Study Design
This Article relied on a comprehensive pool of cases based on a Westlaw
search for all intellectual property law cases discussing substantial similarity
between 2010 and 2019.144 The search returned 285 unfiltered decisions.
After filtering out trademark or patent cases, as well as copyright cases
mentioning but not discussing substantial similarity, the final pool comprised
242 cases.145
The dataset of hand-coded cases included the decision’s date; judicial
circuit; whether the case repeated (to ensure cases were not counted more than
once when a variable such as venue remains the same even as the number of
claims warrant separate reporting); procedural posture; type of work of
authorship; substantial similarity tests and limitations; whether a district or
appellate court decided the case; case outcomes; identity of appellate judges
and district courts; relationship as rivals (or not); mention of willful
infringement; and appeal outcome.
In 2013, Katherine Lippman published a student comment reporting on a
more limited set of variables in substantial similarity case law.146 The
Lippman study reported on appellate cases between 1923 and 2011 as well as
district court cases during that timeframe that resulted in reported appeals.147
This had the unfortunate consequence of omitting a significant number of
the judge-jury dynamic and the impact of equitable triggers) [hereinafter Lim, Judging Equivalence].
144. To compile a sample of opinions, I ran the following Westlaw search: “adv:“SY,DI (substantial
/3 similarity).” For other studies employing a similar methodology, see John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 (2007)
(“[W]e collected every district court and court of appeals decision on the doctrine of equivalents that
appeared in Westlaw . . . .”).
145. Daryl Lim, SS Dataset, (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.dropbox.com/s/satb8u6480d9qsw/SSDataset_Apr%2030.xlsx?dl=0. Even if the analysis did not use a heading, if the opinion discussed the
issue, we included the case in the database if there was a specific discussion in the opinion analyzing
the relevant law or facts. Id.
146. Lippman, supra note 14.
147. Id. Lippman picked the year 1923 because of Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc. 290 F. 959 (2d Cir.
1923), which she regarded as “the oldest case” the substantial similarity test traced its roots to. See
also Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Copyright Substantial Similarity
Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 896 (2013) (“build[ing] upon
Lippman’s work by assigning ‘hard numbers’ to the results of substantial similarity cases at the
appellate level, while determining how selected variables influence case outcomes”).
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district court opinions with no appeal—between eighty and ninety percent of
all district court cases are never appealed.148 Nonetheless, the large number
of cases in the Lippman study—two hundred and thirty four—provides a
useful basis for comparison,149 and leading copyright scholars have cited the
study’s results with approval.150
This Article builds on the Lippman study and significantly refines it.
Using an original hand-coded dataset, in addition to all appellate cases
between 2010 and 2019, this Article reports on all district court opinions
during that period, regardless of whether parties appealed. This Article also
introduces other important refinements including: distinguishing between
procedural wins (such as defeating a motion for summary judgment by the
other side) and substantive wins (which result in a finding of infringement or
non-infringement); the interaction between rivalry and fair use, the impact of
willfulness on case outcomes; interaction between outcomes and tests
employed and their limitations; interactions between individual appellate
judges, as well as interactions between circuit courts on different variables in
the dataset; and of course—the demise of substantial similarity.151
Substantial similarity, like patent law’s doctrine of equivalents and
trademark law’s multifactor likelihood of confusion tests, uses nonliteral
analysis to determine infringement in the sense that the offending article need
not be identical to the plaintiff’s work of authorship, invention, or sign.152 The
three types of intellectual property rights are, of course, also different in
significant ways. With substantial similarity, courts determine what is
copyrighted and what is copied jointly. In contrast, patent law’s doctrine of
equivalence maps patent scope to patent claims, while trademark law focuses
on the similarity of marks and defendants’ willful infringement in determining
likelihood of confusion.153 Nonetheless, like zoology, knowing how a
member of an animal species behaves and why it has resisted decline seen in
other species in the same genus can help broaden our understanding of the law
148. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659 (2004).
149. See Lippman, supra note 14, at 535.
150. See Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L. REV.
605, 621 nn.70 & 72 (2017); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101
IOWA L. REV. 1065, 1070 n.13 (2016); Avani Mehta Sood, Attempted Justice: Misunderstanding and
Bias in Psychological Constructions of Criminal Attempt, 71 STAN. L. REV. 593, 673 n.302 (2019).
151. See infra Part IV.
152. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.
153. See infra Part IV; Beebe, supra note 140, at 1582.
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beyond niche areas and promote cross-fertilization of insights. This Article
discusses these insights in Parts IV and V.
B. Limitations and Caveats
This Article initially used Excel to hand-code the data before converting
it to IBM SPSS Statistics to generate the graphs and crosstabs. Like all
empirical studies, this one has its limitations and caveats. They fall into two
main groups. The first relates to the dataset and statistics, and the second
relates to the nature of litigation.
1. The Database and Statistics
There are several well-recognized limitations to case content study
databases. First, coding “may result in incomplete or inaccurate coding,
despite cross-coding and verification using a population sample.”154 Given,
however, “that the focus is on features of written decisions,” “the data remains
valid as long as it is recognized to refer to a specific population rather than a
sample of all cases in all possible worlds.”155 Second, cases gleaned from
legal databases such as Westlaw are known to underreport jury decisions.156
To some degree, that can be mitigated by comparing it to other studies which
employ similar methods to control for that feature. In this case, this study on
substantial similarity looked to a study on patent law’s doctrine of
equivalents.157
Like earlier empirical studies employing the case content analysis
method, this study avoids regression analysis because “invariance produces
enormous regression coefficients and standard errors that severely limit the
utility of the regression results.”158 Instead, this Article employed the Fisher
Exact Test for contingency tables to test the null hypothesis that a case
154. See Lim, supra note 142.
155. Id.
156. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 144, at 963–64 (“The universe of all decisions is of course
different from the universe of those reported in Westlaw, and in particular our study underreports jury
decisions. But our focus on written decisions (both reported and unreported) allows us to parse the
grounds for decision and the reasoning of the opinions.”).
157. See infra Section IV.B.
158. Beebe, supra note 140, at 1600 n.85. “Regression analysis is inappropriate” for these studies,
raising “the problem of ‘zero cell count’ in which the dependent variable, here, the outcome of the
multifactor test, is invariant for one or more values of an independent variable.” Id. at 1600 & n.85.
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attribute is independent of case outcome.159 This contingency table approach
is more appropriate than regression because the outcomes and attributes are
all categorical variables; furthermore, a Fisher Exact Test is more appropriate
than a chi-squared test because many of the cells have expected counts less
than five. This study calculated Monte Carlo p-values with 50,000 samples.160
For the statistical analysis, the three cases which were repeated and the three
cases which resulted in ‘Cross SJ both denied’ were removed (six cases in
total).
When performing a hypothesis test, a smaller p-value is indicative of
stronger evidence against the null hypothesis, and typically a p-value below
.05 is considered statistically significant evidence against the null hypothesis.
This study performed ten hypothesis tests (one for each attribute), so using a
Bonferroni procedure to control false positives would suggest a cutoff of .05
/ 8 = .00625. The p-values shown have been adjusted by a Bonferroni-Holm
procedure which controls the probability of committing at least one Type I
error (falsely rejecting a null hypothesis) across all tests.161 The number of
data points in this instance is naturally limited by the cases which have been
argued, and the fact that the null hypothesis of independence is not rejected
for all but the posture attribute may be due to the small sample size. The
descriptive charts speak for themselves, and the data is still informative. In
all tests except those looking at circuit variances, the null hypothesis of
independence is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the
attribute is associated with outcome. The tests only concern association and
should not be interpreted to imply a causal relationship between attribute and
outcome. This Article employs simple classifications according to certain
factor outcomes and presents cross tabulations of the test outcome by factor
outcomes and factor outcomes by test outcome.162 Finally, the reported data
is kept to whole numbers without decimal places, following the convention

159. Testing Independence: Chi Squared vs. Fisher’s Exact Test, DATA SCIENCE BLOG (October
17, 2018), https://www.datascienceblog.net/post/statistical_test/contingency_table_tests/ (comparing
the chi-squared test and Fisher’s exact test and concluding that “[g]enerally, the Fisher’s exact test is
preferable to the chi-squared test because it is an exact test”).
160. See G.H. Freeman & J.H. Halton, Note on an Exact Treatment of Contingency, Goodness of
Fit and Other Problems of Significance, 38 BIOMETRIKA 141 (1951); Sture Holm, A Simply
Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure, 6 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF STAT., 65 (1979).
161. See E.L. LEHMANN & J.P. ROMANO, TESTING STATISTICAL HYPOTHESES 351 (Casella et al.,
eds. 3rd ed. 2010).
162. See Lim, supra note 145.
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used in other empirical studies.163
2. The Dynamics of Litigation
Analysis of judicial opinions has well-known limitations.164 Statistics fail
to account for extralegal factors influencing judging such as summary
affirmances, the state of the case record on appeal, and judicial deliberations
in the opinion.165 Litigants may consider the expertise and reputation of the
district court judge in deciding whether to appeal, introducing selection bias
effects into the appellate data.166 Moreover, most cases settle, so decided
cases are a nonrandom subset of all cases.167
The complexity of copyright litigation also makes it difficult to
generalize, from even a study covering hundreds of cases.168 Venue selection
is a significant feature in intellectual property litigation, and parties are not
randomly distributed throughout the judicial districts.169 Some district courts
may hear more cases that eventually settle or that were filed based on
domicile. District court judges are therefore not assigned a random sample of

163. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1161; see Ryan T. Holte & Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 158 (2019);
see also T J Cole, Too Many Digits: The Presentation of Numerical Data, 100 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE
IN CHILDHOOD 608, 609 (2015) https://adc.bmj.com/content/100/7/608.full (“The general principle is
to use two or three significant digits for effect sizes, and one or two significant digits for measures of
variability.”).
164. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1128–29 (2004) (discussing
unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias).
165. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899 (2009).
166. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 243 (2008).
167. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 273–
74 (2006) (finding that between sixty-five and sixty-eight percent of all patent cases filed in the years
of 1995, 1997, and 2000 were resolved via settlement or a probable settlement).
168. See David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1157, 1188 (2011) (“Because patent litigation as a whole is so complex, it is incredibly
complicated to develop and test empirical models.”); Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 143, at
1380 (noting biases inherent in this approach such as “unobserved reasoning, selection bias, and
strategic behavior”).
169. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 924–31 (2001) (discussing the pitfalls of forum shopping that are
posed in patent cases).
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patent lawsuits, since they are assigned cases from the judicial district where
they sit.170 Circumstances such as a particular judge or jury may cause a case
to settle, whereas the same case before another judge or jury could proceed to
an appeal.171 This Article focuses on how appellate and lower courts interpret
precedent. Those interpretations are not uniform and can never be so.172
Another limitation concerns case outcomes. The Priest-Klein “selection
hypothesis” predicts that, given various conditions, plaintiff win rates at trial
should approach fifty percent, because only the close cases survive
settlement—or summary adjudication.173 The hypothesis assumes parties
have equal stakes in the litigation for it to be true.174 More recent studies have
cast the fifty percent hypothesis in doubt, including those dealing specifically
with intellectual property law.175 As Professors Ryan Holte and Ted
Sichelman noted, “[C]hanges in litigation budgets, attorney quality, and other
unobservable factors” may have changed the behavior of parties, rather than
judicial decision making.176 Technological quirks, as well as the nature of the
parties, result in fact-specific outcomes;177 and so might multiple legal

170. Schwartz, supra note 166, at 241–42.
171. See id. at 242 n.119 (“[I]f [judges] have a really tough case, they can put tremendous pressure
on the parties to settle so there won’t be an appealable order.” (quoting Eric Herman, Charting the
Yays and Nays in Federal Court, CHI. L. 1, 10 (1996))).
172. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Does Empirical Evidence on the Civil Justice System Produce or
Resolve Conflict?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 636 (2016) (“[E]ven when the empirical scholars
completely agree on the underlying facts, interpretation of the results can dramatically differ.
Empirical legal scholarship is still worth conducting, but the hope that it will resolve partisan debates
in law is unrealistic.”).
173. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4–6, 17–18 (1984).
174. Id. at 24–29.
175. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 338–39 (1990) (testing the fifty-percent hypothesis and
rejecting it as a description of all civil litigation); see also Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are
the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1310–12 (2003) (arguing
that the Priest-Klein hypothesis is not borne out by the data in patent cases); Jason Rantanen, Why
Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases, (August 15, 2012) (unpublished
research paper) (on file with the University of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 12-15, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132810 (“At best, the Priest-Klein hypothesis
only applies to the selection of disputes, not the selection of individual issues. Due to the presence of
multiple issues in patent cases, there is axiomatically no basis for inferring that a patentee would expect
a fifty-percent chance of winning on each one.”).
176. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 163, at 161.
177. See Schwartz, supra note 168, at 1187 (“For example, patent litigation between branded and
generic drug manufacturers differs from patent litigation over a business method patent held by a non-
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doctrines which may be interrelated so changes in one may affect another.178
Relatedly, the percentage of patentee wins must be regarded with some
caution in concluding whether it is important or not. For example, in
employment discrimination litigation, the plaintiff win rate is thirty-three
percent.179 However, the literature endorses the importance of employment
discrimination training to avoid litigation.180 One reason may be because the
stakes are so asymmetric. To refine the baseline for comparison, this Article
looks instead at results from comparable studies such as outcomes in patent
litigation.181 With these caveats in mind, the discussion turns to the theory
underlying substantial similarity and to the points of departure from
conventional wisdom in practice.
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE
Substantial similarity is in unprecedented decline. This Part describes
how and why. Plaintiffs struggle to prove copyright infringement in a way
never-before seen. Neither the tests courts apply nor the circuits they reside
in adequately account for this startling finding. Instead, this Article identifies
two factors: pretrial motions and non-rival defendants, as well as the
surprising irrelevance of two others—bad faith and the nature of the works at
issue.
A. The Demise of Substantial Similarity
In the 1970s, plaintiffs enjoyed remarkable success. The Lippman study
reported that plaintiffs won sixty-three percent of cases, blowing through even
the generous fifty percent mark predicted by the Priest-Klein hypothesis.182

practicing entity.”).
178. Id. at 1188 (“Changes in precedent can alter lawyers’ behavior in drafting patents.
Furthermore, changes in precedent can also influence party behavior in litigation.”).
179. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 439 n.13 (2004) (citing Michael Delikat & Morris
M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better
Vindicate Their Rights?, DISP. RESOL. J., 56, 56–57 (2003)).
180. See, e.g., Todd J. Maurer & Nancy E. Rafuse, Learning, Not Litigating: Managing Employee
Development and Avoiding Claims of Age Discrimination, 15 ACAD. MGT. PERSPECTIVES 110 (2001).
181. See infra Section IV.A.
182. Id.; see also supra Section III.B.2. As mentioned in Section III.B, the Lippman dataset only
reports on appellate cases and district court cases with appellate opinions.
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By the 1980s, plaintiffs won thirty-six percent of the time.183 The figure fell
to twenty-two percent between 1995 and 2000.184 Like the proverbial canary
in a coalmine, the Lippman study conjectured that substantial similarity’s
decline mirrored a shift in copyright law against owners as the Supreme Court
ruled against them on an array of issues ranging from copyrightability to fair
use.185 When we look at Supreme Court cases from the last twenty years, the
Court favored plaintiffs in nine out of twelve copyright cases,186 with only
three favoring defendants.187 This should have been a boom time for
183. Lippman, supra note 14, at 538.
184. Id. at 539.
185. Id. at 540–41. Of the five copyright decisions between 1970 and 2010, three ruled against the
plaintiff. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (data compiled in
telephone directory were uncopyrightable); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (time shifting was fair use); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 571–72 (1994) (appropriation of song elements in parody was fair use); see also Lippman, supra
note 14, at 541 (“[Campbell] may have induced a trend in substantial similarity decisions to construe
the boundaries of infringement more liberally, absolving more alleged infringers from liability and
impacting the decline in substantial similarity win rates through the mid-1990s.”). But see Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (unauthorized publication of
verbatim excerpts from unpublished memoirs was not fair use); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236
(1990) (holding that statutory successors were entitled to renewal rights though author previously
assigned them to another party).
186. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017) (holding that “a
feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection”); Kirtsaeng
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016) (holding that a court should “give substantial
weight to the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position” when exercising its authority to
award attorney’s fees); Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014) (holding
that laches cannot be invoked to preclude plaintiff’s adjudication damages claim); Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 431 (2014) (holding that a provider that sold subscribers broadcast
television programming streamed over the Internet from small antennas infringed copyright); Golan
v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 318 (2012) (protecting copyrights of authors whose works are protected in
their country of origin, but not in the United States); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154,
157 (2010) (holding that registration requirement does not restrict federal courts’ subject-matter
jurisdiction for infringement suits involving unregistered works); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (holding distributors of device promoting infringement
liable for third parties infringing acts); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221–22 (2003) (holding the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 constitutional); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506
(2001) (holding publishers of periodicals “infringed the Authors’ copyrights by reproducing and
distributing the Articles in a manner not authorized . . . [and] by authorizing [] Electronic Publishers
to place the Articles in [] Databases”).
187. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S.Ct. 881, 892 (2019)
(holding that a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit “not when an application for
registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed
application”); Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 873, 875–76 (2019) (holding that
federal district courts can award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation only in six categories of
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plaintiffs. It was anything but.
Plaintiffs won a trifling 11% of cases at the district courts between 2010
and 2019 (compared with 24% between 1923 and 2011) and 0% on appeal
between 2010 and 2019 (compared with 32% between 1923 and 2011).188
Compared to plaintiff nonliteral infringement win rates in doctrine of
equivalence cases of 21% (district court) and 22% (on appeal), the figures for
modern substantial similarity cases are low.189
Plaintiff win rates on procedure were higher—23% (district court), but
only for successfully fending off a defendant’s motion to dismiss or summary
judgment motion.190 The procedural win rate on appeal in favor of plaintiffs
was 3%.191 What could have accounted for these precipitous declines?
1. The Tests for Substantial Similarity?
Given the controversy they attracted over the years from commentators,
the first culprit would be the substantial similarity tests courts employ. The
Lippman study noted that “[s]uch a significant downturn may reflect the
impact of then-recent decisions that either outlined a new test or applied an
old test in a new way.”192 That conclusion has intuitive appeal. Courts have
no consistent way to compare the two works, and there are other points of
disagreement, including whether the baseline to assess similarity should be
the original work or the accused work.193
According to the Lippman study, the ordinary observer test dominated the

costs specified by Congress); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013) (holding
that the “first sale doctrine applies to copies lawfully made abroad”).
188. Lippman, supra note 14, at 555; Lim, supra note 145.
189. See Lim, supra note 142.
190. See Lim, supra note 145.
191. See id.
192. Lippman, supra note 14, at 539; see also Hickey, supra note 9, at 684 (“Much commentary on
substantial similarity defends one of the existing tests as superior or proposes to replace the confused
doctrine with a new standard.”).
193. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–66 (1985) (using
multiple baselines in noting that amount copied was a quantitatively “insubstantial” part of the original
work but also “13% of the infringing article”); see also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 56 (1936) (rejecting defendants’ work as the baseline to prevent plagiarists from “excus[ing]
the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate”); cf. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907,
913 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[I]nsignificant infringement may be substantial only if the material is
qualitatively important to either [the accused or the original] work.”).
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dataset, accounting for 55% of appeals cases between 1923 and 2011.194
Courts applied the extrinsic/intrinsic test in only 28%, and the
abstraction/filtration/comparison test in 7% of cases.195 Yet, the tests
generally made little difference to the outcome during that period.196 How do
modern cases compare?
This Article found that between 2010 and 2019, outcomes differed more
noticeably. Plaintiffs won 5% of the time when district courts employed the
ordinary observer test.197 They won 2% under the extrinsic/intrinsic test,
lower even than when the court did not identify a test (4%).198 This decimation
across the board, regardless of tests employed, makes the tests employed an
unlikely culprit.
Figure 1 shows test variations across circuits (both district and appellate
levels), clearly showing the ordinary observer test’s dominance in Second
Circuit courts and the extrinsic/intrinsic test in Ninth Circuit courts. Most
circuits track one or the other, with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits employing
both interchangeably. Few courts employed the abstraction/filtration/
comparison test, and none applied more than one test. Figure 2 shows the
stark difference in relative win rates between defendants and plaintiffs under
the various tests, with plaintiffs faring relatively better under the
extrinsic/intrinsic test than the ordinary observer test. Figure 2 also shows
near-parallel lines between substantive and procedural plaintiff wins,
regardless of the test employed.

194. Lippman, supra note 14, at 544.
195. Id.
196. Id.; see also id. at 546 (finding that plaintiffs succeeded within a consistent range—the ordinary
observer test (33%), the extrinsic/intrinsic test (25%), and the abstraction/filtration/comparison test
(24%)). The range of plaintiff success demonstrates that “at least in terms of overall substantial
similarity win rates, if there is an inequity underlying the case law, it should not be attributed to the
tests alone.” Id.
197. See Lim, supra note 145.
198. Id.
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FIGURE 1 | CIRCUITS AND TEST APPLIED (2010–2019)

FIGURE 2 | TESTS AND OUTCOMES (DISTRICT COURT) (2010–2019)
Figures 3 and 4 reveal the dynamics of limitations on win rates at the
district and appellate courts. The idea-expression dichotomy dominates both.
When a court mentions more than one limitation, the result is strikingly

746

[Vol. 48: 713, 2021]

Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

adverse for the plaintiff, with this variance seen more markedly at the district
court level than at the appellate courts. Finally, cases where district and
appellate courts articulated more than one limitation dominated both levels,
possibly indicating a level of sophistication and comfort with the law on
substantial similarity.

FIGURE 3 | LIMITATIONS BY OUTCOMES (DISTRICT COURTS) (2010–2019)
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FIGURE 4 | LIMITATIONS BY OUTCOME (APPELLATE COURTS) (2010–2019)
2. Circuit Variances?
The literature offers a second possibility—circuit variances. Based on a
quantitative analysis of published copyright decisions cross-referenced to
decisions discussed in copyright case books, Professor William Ford observed
in 2006 that “the Second and Ninth Circuits, along with the Supreme Court
and the Southern District of New York, are the most influential courts in the
development of copyright law.”199 The Second Circuit’s copyright decisions
also defined all aspects of copyright law.200 Concerning substantial similarity:
[C]ourts, scholars, and lawyers consider the Second Circuit’s
infringement analysis to be part of the modern copyright law canon.
While a few circuits have made important modifications to its central
199. William K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41–42 (2006).
200. Id. at 41 (“Overall, the Second Circuit is the clear leader in terms of experience and
influence.”); see also Kenneth A. Plevan, The Second Circuit and the Development of Intellectual
Property Law: The First 125 Years, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 143, 143 (2016) (“There is no question that
the Second Circuit has had a significant influence on the development of U.S. intellectual property
law, especially copyright law, and the reasons are evident. Historically, many of the business segments
for which intellectual property rights were key assets, or at the heart of the endeavor, were concentrated
in the New York area, including television, music, advertising, publishing, and theater.”).
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approach, the “Arnstein test,” as it has come to be known, remains
the dominant approach to copyright infringement analysis today.201
Could the fact that the Second Circuit hears most substantial similarity
cases be the reason for its demise?
Intriguingly, outcomes based on circuit variations have been remarkably
consistent. Between 1923 and 2011, the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit
reported comparable win rates at both the trial (24% compared with 22%,
respectively) and appellate levels (33% compared with 34%, respectively).202
Between 2010 and 2019, Second Circuit district courts found for plaintiffs in
13% of cases and there were no appellate cases.203 At the Ninth Circuit,
plaintiff win rates were 10% (district court) and 8% (on appeal) (see Figure 5,
below), again reflecting a consistently low win rate.204

FIGURE 5 | OUTCOMES BY CIRCUIT (DISTRICT COURTS) (2010–2019)

201. Balganesh, supra note 5, at 794.
202. See Lippman, supra note 14, at 560; see also id. at 535 (reporting that over eighty percent of
the appellate opinions “were issued from 1980 to 2011”).
203. See Lim, supra note 145.
204. See id.; supra Figure 5.
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FIGURE 6 | OUTCOMES BY CIRCUIT (APPELLATE COURTS) (2010–2019)
Figures 5 and 6 reveal an interesting result. Despite the overall
dominance of Second Circuit cases, the Ninth Circuit was largely responsible
for developing substantial similarity jurisprudence over the past decade.
However, Figure 5 shows a large spike of the Second Circuit district courts
compared to those from the Ninth Circuit. As those cases get appealed, the
Second Circuit will likely displace the Ninth Circuit’s dominance. Those
seeking a template upon which to build a unifying test, including the Supreme
Court, would do well to start with the Second Circuit’s ordinary observer test
or risk throwing copyright law into disarray.
There is a general downward trend favoring affirmances, with reversals
in civil cases overall falling from 25% in 1960 to 9% in 2003.205 With
substantial similarity, the reversal rate seemed to track that trend at 25%
between 1923 and 2011, dropping to a statistically insignificant number
between 2010 and 2019.206 One reason could be an increasing familiarity with
substantial similarity.207 High reversal rates in the earlier years may simply
205. Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to
Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 135 n.42 (2005) (reporting reversals declining from 24.5% in 1960 to 9.4%
in 2003).
206. Lippman, supra note 14, at 560; see also Lim, supra note 145.
207. Lippman, supra note 14, at 560–61.
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reflect a normal period of instability and adjustment as district courts align
themselves to the expectations of their respective appellate courts.208
The sum of the two findings—relative uniformity of outcomes across
circuits and high affirmance rates—may help inform the debate whether an
appellate circuit with exclusive jurisdiction for copyright law matters.209
Congress established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 and
gave it exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals to introduce expertise and
uniformity in patent law.210 Detractors over the years have argued against the
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.211
For the purposes of this Article, however, the findings suggest that neither
the test nor the circuits themselves adequately account for the demise of
substantial similarity. What else could it be? The Lippman study provides a
critical clue to the demise of substantial similarity.
According to the Lippman study, 55% of cases where the plaintiff won
were bench and jury trials.212 In contrast, it observed that only 14% of such
trials ended up favoring alleged infringers.213 Summary judgment motions
flip the picture, making up only 3% of plaintiff wins, but a whopping 51% of
defendant wins.214 The Lippman study concluded that “a defendant-favorable
district court decision finding that the works are not substantially similar is
less likely to be overturned on appeal because, in most cases, that decision
was made at the summary judgment stage; and, presumably, the case is weak
or frivolous.”215
While plausible, a conclusion that pretrial motion dismissals equate
plaintiffs bringing weak or frivolous cases is unsatisfying. The fact is that as
a matter of litigation burden, defendants have it easier.216 They need only
208. See generally Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (2011).
209. Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court:
Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 719 (1999)
(“[C]opyright is a highly specialized and technical body of law . . . that would be best handled by
specialized judges.”).
210. Lim, The Federal Circuit’s “Great Dissenter,” supra note 23, at 876–77.
211. See, e.g., Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013).
212. See Lippman, supra note 14 at 556.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 557.
216. Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, 33 L.A. LAW. 32, 40 (2010) (“Case law has provided
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show that plaintiffs failed to make out their case on the pleadings, specifically
by showing a lack of substantial similarity, for instance, through the copying
of unprotected elements; in contrast, plaintiffs must satisfy a gamut of factual
and legal issues to prevail.217 Moreover, the evidentiary requirements under
summary judgment are lower than at trial. A more robust answer, therefore,
needs to consider how courts make substantial similarity determinations.
B.

Judge and Jury Dynamics

Unlawful appropriation rests on the plaintiff’s protectable expression as
well as on the relevant public’s impression for whose primary benefit
copyright was created in the first place.218 For this reason, Arnstein placed
juries at the center of its test for substantial similarity.219 It emphasized that a
jury was “peculiarly fitted to determine” the response of the ordinary lay
hearer, noting that:
The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation
as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns from
his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of
his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from
plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music
is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something
which belongs to the plaintiff.220
The factual determination by the jury is a safety valve to guard against
judges cloistered in their courtrooms becoming arbiters of public perception.
This judicial usurpation breeds precisely the sort of arbitrariness that courts
and copyright scholars complain about. The need for accountability becomes
defendants with an impenetrable shield of confusing and often contradictory principles that thwart
plaintiffs in nearly every instance, with only tiny cracks in that shield providing a mere glimpse of
hope.”).
217. See Lippman, supra 14, at 523–24 (discussing what is required to lay out a prima facie case of
copyright infringement including the substantial similarity requirement).
218. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Balganesh, supra note 5, at
794 (“[C]ourts around the country take their guidance on the copyright infringement analysis from a
landmark decision of the Second Circuit that is believed to have defined the structure of the
infringement inquiry and the jury’s role in it . . . .”).
219. See supra Section II.B.
220. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
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even more evident when one realizes that almost every judge approached
substantial similarity as a matter of first impression when compared to other
areas of intellectual property law.221 For example, the appellate judges
hearing doctrine of equivalents appeals over the same period encountered an
average of sixteen cases each.222

FIGURE 7 | APPELLATE OUTCOMES IN DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS CASES
With judges hearing substantial similarity appeals, it would be impossible
to produce a graph anywhere close to Figure 7. Instead, almost every
appellate judge heard a substantial similarity case as a matter of first
impression. Each heard an average of one case each decade. District court
numbers are only marginally better.223 The Southern District of New York
has the greatest level of expertise in substantial similarity. It heard 31% of all
district court cases.224 The next highest figure, at a distant 7%, came from the
District of Massachusetts, and not from any district court in the Ninth
Circuit.225 However, even in the Southern District of New York, each judge
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See Lim, supra note 145.
See infra Figure 9.
See infra Figure 11.
See Lim, supra note 145.
See id.
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heard less than two cases each decade.226
Professor Suja Thomas’s work shows divisions between courts will be
frequent whenever courts substitute their own judgment of the facts for a jury
verdict.227 This is because judges look at what a single juror would find and
fail to replicate the hive mind of an actual jury and fail to account for the group
decision-making dynamics.228 This led Thomas to conclude that judges who
attempt to decide dispositive motions based on their preconception of what a
reasonable jury would find fail and instead splinter legal certainty.229
Worse, the problem will not likely be remedied on appeal. Appellate
judges face the same difficult mental hurdles as the district judges below.230
Professor Irina Manta observed that the likelihood of overturning the lower
court’s determination in copyright cases is low, given the high standard of
review and the appellate court’s awareness that overturning those decisions
may strain limited judicial resources and may result in an artificially lower
number of appeals succeeding.231 This may help explain the enduringly low
plaintiff win rates. At some point, modern copyright plaintiffs were sucked
into a vicious cycle of pretrial motions and appeals that suppressed their win
rates over time.
This Article reveals a reversal rate of 3%, and an affirmance rate of 82%
percent.232 These are astoundingly high figures. Judges made a similar coup
in patent cases, usurping from juries the responsibility of interpreting patent
claims.233 Scholars report high reversal rates on appeal of between 35% and
44%.234
Intriguingly, the Lippman study observed a significantly higher reversal
rate, and attributed it to the fact that “a defendant-favorable district court
226. See infra Figure 12; see also Lim, supra note 145.
227. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 759 (2009).
228. Id. at 770–73.
229. See id. at 784.
230. See Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1326 (2012) (“Of course,
appellate judges at any level are subject to similar biases as trial court judges.”).
231. Id. at 1327 (“[S]etting aside decisions below increases the strain on limited judicial resources
by such a large amount[] that they are effectively likely to be set aside only a small percentage of the
time whether they are ‘reasonable’ or not.”).
232. See Lim, supra note 145.
233. See Lim, Judging Equivalence, supra note 143.
234. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting a 44% reversal rate); Kimberly A. Moore,
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
231, 233 (2005) (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate).
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decision finding that the works are not substantially similar is less likely to be
overturned on appeal because, in most cases, that decision was made at the
summary judgment stage[,] and[] presumably, the case is weak or
frivolous.”235 What does this observation mean for low reversal rates when
district courts find in favor of defendants? It may well be that defendants are
mounting stronger cases in their own defense. It may also be a function of
appellate courts not wanting to commit district court resources to reopening
cases for trial.236 Or, as Lippman suggests, it might be a temporal quirk that
more frequent reversals “reflect a period of uncertainty in the law [which]
decrease[s] over time or a disagreement between district court and appellate
judges on the . . . merits.”237 In any case, it is questionable at best whether
judges have better expertise at substantial similarity determinations than
juries.

235. Lippman, supra note 14, at 557; see also id. at 560 (reporting higher reversal rates—15% at
the Second Circuit and 23% at the Ninth Circuit—suggesting less homogeneity and greater scrutiny
of district court opinions).
236. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.
237. Lippman, supra note 14, at 561–62.
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FIGURE 8 | APPELLATE JUDGES (2010–2019)
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FIGURE 9 | DISTRICT COURTS (2010–2019)
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FIGURE 10 | SECOND CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES (2010–2019)
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Over the years, courts and commentators continued to extol the centrality
of juries.238 In theory, this would safeguard plaintiffs against defendants
seeking a quick disposal of the case on a motion to dismiss or summary
judgment.239 In practice, this Article reveals a surprising partnership between
judges and defendants to usurp the jury’s role in substantial similarity
inquiries.
Defendants may bring motions for summary judgment and so invite
judges to make favorable and expedient determinations.240 When this
happens, judges may rule on substantial similarity as a matter of law when
defendants offer sufficient evidence in pleadings that no reasonable jury could
find unlawful appropriation.241 Courts have also extended this practice to
motions to dismiss.242 In an astonishing 62% of cases, judges readily accepted
a defendant’s invitation to rule on substantial similarity on one motion or the
other without an iota of jury input.243

238. See Loren & Reese, supra note 5, at 646 (“Substantial similarity is a question of fact.”); Ben
Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 319, 351 (2013)
(noting that “a showing of substantial similarity is a question of fact”); see also Peter F. Gaito
Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[Q]uestions of noninfringement have traditionally been reserved for the trier of fact.”); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353,
1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[S]ummary judgment is not highly favored on questions of substantial similarity
in copyright cases . . . .” (quoting Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1989))); Oren Bracha
& John M. Golden, Redundancy and Anti-Redundancy in Copyright, 51 CONN. L. REV. 247, 275
(2019) (noting “the substantial similarity standard, which is applied case by case and often by juries”).
239. See, e.g., Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that
courts historically have been reluctant to make subjective determinations in copyright cases regarding
the similarity between two works on summary judgment); TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp.
2d 588, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss copyright claim against defendant who used
the lyrical phrase and recording “say what” sampled from plaintiff’s song); see also ERIC OSTERBERG,
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION: ANALYZING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY, PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE
5-524-1501 (2020).
240. See, e.g., Boone v. Jackson, 206 F. App’x 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment
in favor of defendant as to use of lyrical phrase “holla back” and noting deposition testimony that
contradicted plaintiff’s prior assertions).
241. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding summary
judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity).
242. Peter F. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 64 (noting that when evaluating substantial similarity on a motion
to dismiss, “no discovery or fact-finding is typically necessary, because ‘what is required is only a
visual [aural] comparison of the works[]’” (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759,
766 (2d Cir. 1991))).
243. See Lim, supra note 145.
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FIGURE 11 | POSTURE BY OUTCOME (2010–2019)
Figure 11 shows the devastating impact of defendant pretrial motions on
plaintiff win rates. Plaintiffs prevail about 40% of the time when they bring
a pretrial motion, compared to 74% when defendants bring a summary
judgment motion and 76% on a motion to dismiss.244
The Lippman study corroborates this finding and suggests that the
partnership has some history to it.245 It observed that in the mid-1980s
plaintiff win rates fell as the practice became comparatively more prevalent.246
It alluded to the fact that
[t]his result raises the possibility that summary judgment on the
substantial similarity issue may actually decrease the likelihood that
a copyright holder will prevail due to the fact that the proper test for
substantial similarity—which “requires the response of the ordinary

244. See Lim, supra note 145.
245. See Lippman, supra note 14, at 554 (tracking the most frequent procedural postures of the
appealed district court opinions from 1970 to 2010).
246. See id. Lippman notes that “an increase in summary adjudications coincides with a decline in
the frequency of trials, but it also corresponds to a decrease in substantial similarity win rates.” Id. at
557.
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lay observer,” not the judge—is not applied.247
In theory, the move from cases based on the earlier 1909 Copyright Act
to the 1976 Copyright Act may have influenced the outcome of cases.248
However, nothing in scholarly commentary indicates a material difference in
the test courts applied.249 For instance, contemporary cases continued to apply
Arnstein, decided in 1946, without distinguishing between the relevant
Acts.250
An important related question is whether there are circuit variances in this
trend. Robert Helfing anecdotally observed this practice in the context of the
Second and Ninth Circuits. Helfing noted that the Second Circuit “has
loosened the reins and expressly authorized the summary resolution of claims
on the basis of a judge’s emotional response to works of authorship.”251 In
contrast, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has been mostly faithful to this judicial
restraint.”252 Figure 8 shows that Helfing is only partially correct. The Second
Circuit granted summary judgments and motions to dismiss to infringers in
67% of its caseload, while the Ninth Circuit did so in 66% of its caseload.253

247. Id. (quoting Julie J. Bisceglia, Summary Judgment on Substantial Similarity in Copyright
Actions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 51, 55–56 (1993)).
248. See Gabriel Godoy-Dalmau, Substantial Similarity: Kohus Got it Right, 6 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 231, 236–38 (2017) (examining the history of the substantial similarity
test from the 1909 Copyright Act to the 1976 Copyright Act).
249. Id. at 241–43 (noting that because the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Act do not expressly reference
the substantial similarity inquiry and Congress and the Supreme Court have failed to give explicit
guidance on the test, lower courts are still using various tests developed over time to handle the issue).
250. See supra Section II.B.
251. See Helfing, supra note 16, at 764.
252. Id.
253. See Lim, supra note 145.
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FIGURE 12 | CIRCUIT BY POSTURE (2010–2019)
It is unlikely that judges intend to impede plaintiffs’ right of access to jury
trials, but the result of finding evidentiary insufficiency is that the route is
blocked. Judges engaging in this practice usually begin with the mantra that
“a court may make a finding of non-infringement as a matter of law on
summary judgment if the similarity between the works concerns only noncopyrightable elements, or if no reasonable jury, properly instructed, would
find as to the protectable elements that the two works are substantially
similar,” and then summarily proceed to do so.254 Courts themselves have
framed this practice as proper as long as a “court has before it all that is
necessary in order to make such an evaluation.”255
254. Architects Collective v. Pucciano & English, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2017);
see, e.g., Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc., 825 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir.
2016) (standing by the “core premise that judges can, in certain cases, remove the question of
substantial similarity from jury consideration”); Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir.
2001) (stating that while substantial similarity “typically should be left to the factfinder, summary
judgment may be appropriate if the court can conclude, after viewing the evidence and drawing
inferences in a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party, that no reasonable juror could find
substantial similarity”); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th
Cir. 1983) (“[S]ummary judgment for defendant is appropriate where works are so dissimilar that a
claim of infringement is without merit.”).
255. Peter F. Gaito Architecture v. Simone Development, 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010); see
Klauber Brothers, Inc. v. The Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 557 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing
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Professor Amy Cohen warned that “the concept of substantial similarity
itself has become more, rather than less, ambiguous as it has been subjected
to judicial interpretation over the years.”256 The first step toward legal
certainty is to reclaim the jury’s place in the substantial similarity inquiry. For
now, however, plaintiffs must take the world as it is, not as they wish it to be.
Given the reality of copyright infringement being decided overwhelmingly by
judges, having a well-pled case based on written submissions to the court
becomes even more important. Attorneys need to conduct a thorough analysis
of the two works by creating a chart with similarities and dissimilarities as
well as whether the identified elements are likely to be considered protectable
or unprotectable. In this regard, plaintiffs would do well to have a detailed
and compelling narrative by accounting for factors that count and those that
do not.257 The next section identifies both of these.
C. Rivals and Rogues
The Supreme Court described fair use as providing a guarantee of
“breathing space within the confines of copyright,” and it acts as a policy lever
for courts to avoid the harshness of finding infringement on the defendant
when the circumstances demanded it.258 Substantial similarity and fair use
that courts deciding the issue of substantial similarity is appropriate as a matter of law if no reasonable
juror could find the two works at issue substantially similar); Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279
F. Supp. 3d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Numerous courts in this district have resolved the issue of
fair use on a motion for judgment on the pleadings by conducting a side-by-side comparison of the
works at issue.”), aff’d, 729 F. App’x 131 (2d Cir. 2018); Peter F. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 66 (“[I]t is
entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as a matter of law, ‘either because the
similarity between two works concerns only non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work, or
because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are substantially
similar.’” (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983))); Wager
v. Littell, 549 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that “[w]hile similarity is often a question
of fact for a jury, . . . the issue can be decided as a matter of law, even at the pleading stage, by
examining the four corners of the complaint together with the works themselves when ‘no reasonable
jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works’ are strikingly similar.” (quoting Peter F.
Gaito, 602 F.3d. at 63–64)).
256. Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial
Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 722–2332 (1987).
257. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, at 64 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1986); 3–12 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12.10) (“[T]the works themselves supersede and control . . . any contrary allegations,
conclusions or descriptions of the works contained in the pleadings.” (quoting Walker v. Time Life
Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1986); 4–13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (2009))).
258. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Ann Bartow, A
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have much in common.259 Both operate as common law doctrines even though
Congress provided a statutory basis for fair use in the Copyright Act of
1976.260 Both present courts with the challenge of applying a single standard
across a wide array of works from software to architectural designs.261 With
both, courts consider the purpose the defendant seeks to achieve and the harm
its copying causes the plaintiff and whether the defendant’s copying amounted
to misappropriation.262 Both fair use and substantial similarity are arbitrary,
anecdotal, and misunderstood.263
Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 471
(2014) (describing Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, as the Court’s “most important nonliteral copying fair use
case” and how it “dial[ed] back the importance of commercial use in a fair use evaluation”).
259. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Comment, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1459, 1480 (2008) (“The basic test of substantial similarity for infringement—which is vital for
the public to evaluate whether its conduct is permissible—is, unfortunately, ‘largely subjective, thus
permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived equities in a case.’
And, of course, the fair use doctrine is notoriously fact-specific, leaving little guidance for users of
copyrighted works on whether a particular use is fair.” (quoting Litman, supra note 14, at 1005)).
260. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (2012) (stipulating exclusive rights are granted “subject to” fair use); see
also Balganesh, supra note 14, at 215 (“Unlike fair use, which today finds mention in the Copyright
Act of 1976, substantial similarity continues to remain a doctrine that is policed, enforced, and molded
entirely by courts. In this respect it is perhaps more common-law-like than fair use, with courts often
finding themselves completely free to adapt the doctrine to new contexts and technological
developments.”).
261. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (stating that fair use cannot “be simplified with brightline rules, for the [copyright] statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis”);
see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (recognizing that not all
works can be compared in the same way); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 209 (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can
give a general answer.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Lecture, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1291
(1999) (“For all its exposure, our understanding of fair use has not progressed much beyond Justice
Story’s observation [that the fair use doctrine] . . . was ‘one of those intricate and embarrassing
questions . . . in which it is not . . . easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any
general principles applicable to all cases.”’ (quoting Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841))); Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for
Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 683 (2010)
(noting that “the test for infringement of copyright is vague and determinations must be made ‘ad
hoc’”).
262. See Balganesh, supra note 14, at 272 (noting that “the fair-use determination—at least as
codified today—makes use of factors and variables that are legitimately examined as part of the
substantial-similarity determination”).
263. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2008) (“This affirmative defense represents the most important—and
amorphous—limitation on the otherwise extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners
under section 106 of the Act.”); see also id. at 554 (“[M]uch of our conventional wisdom about our
fair use case law, deduced as it has been from the leading cases, is wrong.”); Lippman, supra note 14,
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Most relevant for this Article, however, is the fact that both fair use and
substantial similarity are entrenched in United States copyright law’s
utilitarian roots.264 The second fair use factor requires courts to examine the
“nature of the copyrighted work,” while the third factor asks them to consider
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole.”265 These are the same questions a court faces
in a substantial similarity inquiry.266 Indeed, for some, the extent of the
overlap between substantial similarity and fair use begs the question whether
one or the other is redundant.267
In focusing on the second and third factors, commentators miss the story
that the other two factors tell us about substantial similarity. The first fair use
factor requires examination of “the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes.”268 The fourth fair use factor weighs “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”269 Collectively, these
factors reference the commercial impact that the defendant’s work would
likely have on the plaintiff, and are the most influential to courts.270
The practical effect is that the greater the private economic rewards
reaped by the defendant to the exclusion of broader public benefits, the more

at 519 (“It [is] unclear whether these opinions are representative of the substantial similarity doctrine
as it is practiced in courts today.”).
264. For a discussion of the overlap, see Oren Bracha & John M. Golden, Redundancy and AntiRedundancy in Copyright, 51 CONN. L. REV. 247, 275–76 (2019). For a discussion on utilitarianism
in copyright law, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990). See also Balganesh, supra note 14, at 210
(observing that U.S. copyright law rejects “[p]ersonhood-based or analogous deontic theories . . . as
incapable of coexisting with the institution’s utilitarian focus”).
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)–(3) (Supp. 1 1976).
266. See Cohen, supra note 256, at 728 (“The degree of similarity between the two works was also
one of several factors considered in determining the broader equitable defense of fair use. The fair
use doctrine also considered the type of work involved and the way that the defendant had used that
work.”).
267. Id. at 745 (“A final problem with the traditional approach to copyright infringement is the
confusing overlap it creates with the fair use doctrine.”); see also Balganesh, supra note 14, at 272
(“[H]aving courts reconsider some of the same issues that they did under their preliminary analysis of
the entitlement seems highly redundant and palpably illogical.”).
268. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2016).
269. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
270. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Law, Visual Art, and Money, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1331, 1349
(2018) (stating that “those two factors turn out to be the most important”).

765

[Vol. 48: 713, 2021]

Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

likely fair use will favor the plaintiff.271 “Focusing on economic rewards an
artist seeks in pursuing his or her passion disadvantages artists who seek to
profit from their work.”272 The Second Circuit noted that its core concern is
“the unfairness that arises when a secondary user makes unauthorized use of
copyrighted material to capture significant revenues as a direct consequence
of copying the original work.”273 Conversely, a court would find parodies
excused by fair use even if the plaintiff satisfies every element of
infringement, including substantial similarity.274
Similarly, with infringement, in formulating the ordinary observer test,
the Second Circuit reasoned that since a plaintiff’s legally protected interest
lies in his or her interest in the potential financial returns from his or her work,
the substantial similarity determination should be made by the work’s
audience.275 As Professor Daniel Gervais observed:
When considering propriety in the infringement analysis, there is a
distinction between a commercially consumptive use, on the one
hand, and a bona fide creative reuse, on the other hand. It is well
established that commerciality is not a bar to a finding of
transformative fair use, but it weighs heavily against a finding of fair
use in a case involving a consumptive use. An unauthorized
consumptive use by a defendant can be considered prima facie
improper.276
To some degree, every creator uses preexisting material that others
created. Copyright law’s utilitarianism means that the law sides with

271. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Loren, supra note 270, at
1352 (“If a use by another of expressive content from a copyrighted work affects the sales of that
copyrighted work, then that use should be treated with less tolerance in an effort to preserve the
incentive effect of the marketable right of the copyright.”).
272. Loren, supra note 270, at 350.
273. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922
(2d. Cir. 1994)).
274. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Ross Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (finding that a rap
group’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman,” was fair use even if the rap group intended the
parody for commercial use because the parody was a transformative use of the song); Blanch, 467
F.3d at 246, 254 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 923) (finding use of preexisting fashion
photographs was a fair use and separating transformative reuse from mere “untransformed
duplication,” such as a photocopy).
275. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
276. See Gervais, supra note 14, at 616.
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plaintiffs only as far as it is necessary to the advancement of knowledge and
learning.277
While plagiarists might be condemned on ethical grounds, courts
employing both fair use and substantial similarity have been much more
forgiving to non-rivals who used copyrighted work in order to produce their
own work the same way.278 When rivals copy, they may infringe due to
improper appropriation. In contrast, non-rivals are more likely to fulfill the
constitutional direction and their use of the copyrighted works are more likely
to be “proper” according to Professor Gervais’s terminology.279 Figure 13
confirms this—when the plaintiff and the defendant were non-rivals,
defendants won on the merits a stunning 60% of the time, compared to 28%
when the parties were rivals.280

277. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 76 (2014)
(“[E]xclusive rights in intellectual property can prevent competition in protected works, thereby
allowing the rightsholder to charge a premium for access and ultimately limiting these valuable works’
diffusion to society at large. For another, given that knowledge is frequently cumulative, society
benefits when subsequent creators are not prevented from building on previous artistic creations to
generate new works.”); see also Loren, supra note 270, at 1352 (“[A]s a law that is designed to provide
an incentive for artists to invest their time and talent in the creation of new works, and as a law that
exists in a capitalistic economy, a focus in copyright on monetary effects of the use of another’s
expression is understandable.”).
278. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the importance
of limits on the extent of protection “so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation”); Loren,
supra note 270, at 1348 (“The genesis of fair use is in the recognition by courts of a need to allow for
some copying of the expressive content of copyrighted works, lest copyright lead to monopolistic
stagnation in expression.”).
279. See Gervais, supra note 14, at 617 (asserting that purely creative use of another’s work, as
opposed to copying with “commercial intent,” would “fulfil the constitutional directi[ve]”).
280. See infra Figure 13; Lim, supra note 145.
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FIGURE 13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUTCOMES AND WHETHER PARTIES
WERE RIVALS (DISTRICT COURT) (2010–2019)
In addition to rivalry, this Article also examines the impact of willful
infringement on case outcomes. Copyright infringement is a strict liability
tort. Plaintiffs can establish infringement merely by showing actual copying
that resulted in the production of a substantially similar work.281 Judge
Learned Hand worried of its harsh result, and scholars have maintained that
liability without fault was immoral, inefficient, and inconsistent with the
standard tort practice of only holding liable those defendants who have acted
wrongfully.282 Thus, cases such as Arnstein insist that copying must be
“improper,” “unlawful,” “illicit,” or “wrongful[].”283 Professor Shyamkrishna
Balganesh observed that the defendant’s wrongdoing informs the normative
aspect of substantial similarity analysis in a manner often ignored by
281. See supra Section II.B.1.
282. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., dissenting) (“Ordinarily an
act does not become a wrong, when to make it so, one must resort to consequences arising from it in
the actual sequence of events which reasonable persons would not anticipate . . . . I can see no reason
why the ordinary rule of liability for torts should not apply to copying a copy . . . .”); see, e.g., Steven
Hetcher, The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault-Liability Standard to Amateur Digital Remix, 62 FLA.
L. REV. 1275 (2010) (arguing for a fault liability regime); Kent Sinclair, Jr., Liability for Copyright
Infringement—Handling Innocence in a Strict-Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940 (1970).
283. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–73 (2d Cir. 1946).
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commentators.284 Similarly, Professor Daniel Gervais observed that juries
may find copying if the defendant appeared to be free-riding on the plaintiff’s
work, “even though free-riding is not per se illegal.”285
Procedurally, juries may fail to distinguish actual copying from
substantial similarity and apply a normative analysis of substantial similarity
that rests on a value judgement about whether the defendant was a “bad
guy.”286 That dynamic is found in trademark infringement. As Professor
Barton Beebe observed, bad intent decisively sealed the fate of the trademark
defendant.287 Similarly in copyright cases, jurors could conclude that the
defendant misappropriated more copyrightable material.
In theory, copyright law is clear that the plaintiff need not show the
defendant behaved willfully.288 In practice, courts have shown remarkable
fidelity. The data reveals that courts ignore willfulness on the question of
substantial similarity.289 Figure 14 shows both the rarity of willful
infringement and its irrelevance to the outcome. Allegations of willful
infringement arose only in five cases. Plaintiffs won 2% of those cases,
compared to 9% of cases when willful infringement was not at issue.290

284. See Balganesh, supra note 14, at 215 (“As a normative inquiry, copyright’s doctrinal device
for establishing wrongful copying is the idea of ‘substantial similarity.’”).
285. Gervais, supra note 14, at 610.
286. See Balganesh et. al., supra note 6, at 277 (observing that when jurors engage in a substantial
similarity test, they have already seen evidence of actual copying, resulting in confirmation bias to
find two works substantially similar).
287. See Beebe, supra note 140, at 1626–31.
288. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1 n.1 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]nnocence is no
defense to an action for copyright infringement.”).
289. Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth,
98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 182 (1994) (“[S]ubstantial similarity and resulting infringement are found
without reference to any standard to give substantial similarity meaning and without regard to the
impact of the defendant’s activities on the plaintiff.”).
290. See Lim, supra note 145.
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FIGURE 14 | OUTCOME BY WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT (DISTRICT COURTS)
(2010–2019)
Whether the low traction rate has to do with the shift from jury
determinations to professional judges disposing of cases via pre-trial motions
is an interesting subject for future studies. Similarly, it would be helpful to
see if there is a difference in case outcomes between being willful in the
intentional sense and being a normatively bad actor. Finally, it would be
interesting to know whether willfulness shows up in the data as a strategic
means of enhancing damages, and if so, whether there is an appreciable
effect.291 In the meantime, stakeholders will do well to note the impact of nonrivalry on case outcomes while avoiding becoming distracted by allegations
of willful infringement.
D. Works of Authorship
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.”292 It lists eight categories of works:
literary; musical; dramatic; pantomimes and choreographic; pictorial, graphic,

291. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.
292. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).
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and sculptural; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; and architectural works.”293 These categories are neither rigid nor
closed. For instance, the Copyright Act of 1790 protected only maps, charts,
and books.294 Musical compositions were routinely registered as “books”
until the Copyright Act of 1831.295 When the computer industry’s growth and
profitability of mass-marketed software made illicit copying of computer
programs inexpensive, easy, and prevalent, copyright law provided a ready
solution.296 Some studies use as few as two categories, while others used up
to six categories.297 This study used eight categories that best reflected the
types of works in the dataset: literary; musical; pictorial, graphical sculptural;
computer programs; factual; architectural; dramatic; and cinematographic
works.
With copyright law covering such diverse media types and forms of
expression, substantial similarity strains at being a one-size-fits-all test.
Unsurprisingly, the literature is rich with calls for courts to better map
substantial similarity tests to the type of work at issue.298 One way to do this
is to focus on the similarities in the aesthetic appeal of the artistic works, rather
than on both their similarities and differences, and focus on the latter for
functional works rather than their overall impressions.299
Figure 15 reveals that the ordinary observer test dominated nearly every
category of work. Given its ubiquity and the dominance of district courts from
the Second Circuit, that result is unsurprising. More interesting are areas
293. Id.
294. See Copyright Act of 1790 § 1 (1790) (amended 1802). See generally Peter Yu, The Copy in
Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL GOODS 65 (Jessica C. Lai &
Antoinette Maget Dominicé, eds., 2016).
295. William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice, THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (2000),
http://digital-law-online.info/patry/patry5.html.
296. Root, supra note 45.
297. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 263, at 572 (looking at “new media” and “traditional twodimensional nonvirtual print media”); Rogers, supra note 147, at 926 (dividing subject matter into
“high-tech subject matter” and “low-tech subject matter”).
298. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 5, at 1823 (arguing that “courts tailor infringement tests based
on characteristics of the works at issue”); see also Jeannette Rene Busek, Comment, Copyright
Infringement: A Proposal for a New Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of
Possible Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1777, 1778 (1998); Lieberman, supra note 10; David
Nimmer, et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software
in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 636 (1988); Jennifer Understahl, Note,
Copyright Infringement and Poetry: When is a Red Wheelbarrow the Red Wheelbarrow?, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 915 (2005).
299. See supra note 298.
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where Figure 15 shows that the ordinary observer test is not dominating—
namely computer programs and dramatic works. Both industries, associated
with Silicon Valley or Hollywood, are found in the Ninth Circuit’s orbit, and
therefore are within the ambit of the extrinsic/intrinsic test.
Figure 15 also shows the abstraction/filtration/comparison test’s
prominence in only one category—computer programs. This result is again
unsurprising, since as noted in Section IIB, the Second Circuit devised the test
specifically for computer programs. More interesting is the convergence of
all three tests in computer programs—the only type of work where this occurs,
and with almost equal frequency. If the Supreme Court is to articulate a
uniform test, the software industry would likely benefit the most from the
disentanglement of the overlapping formalistic tests.

FIGURE 15 | TYPE OF WORK BY SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST (2010–2019)
Refocusing on plaintiff wins, a seasoned observer of copyright cases
would guess that works with rich, expressive content, such as literary and
musical works, would receive a greater level of protection than databases,
computer programs, or architectural works, which are factual or functional
and therefore lie closer to the edge of the unprotectible ideas, scènes à faire,
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or the merger doctrine discussed in Section II.B..300 Surprisingly, the data
shows that is not the case.
Figure 16 (below) shows that plaintiffs had a higher percentage of wins
in literary and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works than in the other
categories of works. However, a closer look shows that there were many more
cases in these two categories of works than other types of works.301 What is
more telling, therefore, is the gap between defendant and plaintiff win rates.
As Figure 17 reveals, the win rates in both of those categories are
approximately the same as those in computer programs, factual, and
architectural works. Plaintiffs fared abysmally with dramatic works and did
surprisingly well with cinematographic works.

FIGURE 16 | TYPE OF WORK BY OUTCOME (DISTRICT COURTS) (2010–2019)

300. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The
law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.”).
301. See Lim, supra note 145.
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FIGURE 17 | TABLE COMPARING PLAINTIFF WIN RATES BY TYPE OF WORK
(2010–2019)
Given the demise of substantial similarity reported in Section IV.A, it
follows that odds are generally against plaintiffs.302 Dramatic works may have
proven a particularly difficult arena for plaintiffs because unprotectible
content nips at their heels. To protect their work, plaintiffs must show they
have “use[d] creativity to transform facts and ideas into an expression that
displays the stamp of the author’s originality,” while excluding elements
following from a work’s theme rather than from an author’s creativity.303
When courts examine similarities in “total concept and feel, theme, characters,
plot, sequence, pace, and setting,”304 they look at the “totality of [the
characters’] attributes and traits as well as the extent to which the defendants’
characters capture the ‘total concept and feel’ of figures in [the plaintiff’s
work].”305 This may result in very few works satisfying the substantial
similarity tests.
The truth behind the high percentage of plaintiff wins in cinematographic
work is less dramatic than it appears at first glance. The dataset reported only
fourteen cinematographic cases (out of two hundred and ten district court
302. Lippman, supra note 14, at 522 (observing “concern that case law is sharply skewed in favor
of the defendants”).
303. See Lewinson v. Henry Holt & Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 547, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Hudson v. Universal Studios, Inc., No. 04-CV-6997, 2008 WL 4701488, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2008)).
304. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996).
305. Sheldon Abend Revocable Tr. v. Spielberg, 748 F. Supp. 2d 200, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(alteration in original) (quoting Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 309–10 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).

774

[Vol. 48: 713, 2021]

Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

opinions).306 The four plaintiff victories in these fourteen cases skews the
actual likelihood of a plaintiff win to be higher than the win rate a larger
sample size would yield. For that reason, Figure 17 only reports on district
court wins, as breaking down the relatively small number of appellate wins
(thirty-four) to the eight categories of types of work does not provide a
meaningful basis for comparison. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in 2010,
a leading entertainment litigator observed that “[copyright] infringement
claims against motion picture studios and television networks, for all intents
and purposes, are dead.”307 One reason may be an onerously high threshold
for proving substantial similarity in screenplays.308
As expected, defendants easily trounced plaintiffs with architectural
works, computer programs, and factual works. Factual and functional works
lie closest to the boundaries of protectable expression, which raise difficulties
for plaintiffs.309 Copyright is “thin,” and plaintiffs may need to show the
defendant copied substantially the entire work or bodily appropriation of
expression.310 The fact that most defendant works involve non-rivals
combined with copyright’s generally pro-dissemination utilitarian stance may
lead to courts leaning in the defendant’s favor in close cases.
The challenge of proving substantial similarity is heightened where the
field is crowded or where aesthetic choices may be secondary to consumer
demands or functional requirements.311 In these instances, “the narrow scope
of protectable expression necessitates that plaintiffs show something akin to
306. See Lim, supra note 145.
307. See Lowe, supra note 216, at 32. “Of the 48 copyright infringement cases against studios or
networks that resulted in a final judgment within the Second and Ninth Circuits (and the district courts
within those circuits) in the last two decades, the studios and networks prevailed in all of them.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
308. Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin’ Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright
Infringement and the Motion Picture Screenplay: Toward an Improved Framework, 10 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 359, 360 (2003) (noting that the “overwhelming percentage” of lawsuits against Hollywood
movies failed and that “vulnerable” screenwriters face the “difficult challenge” of proving their script
was misappropriated).
309. Attia v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The problem of distinguishing
an idea from its expression is particularly acute when the work of ‘authorship’ is of a functional nature
. . . .”).
310. See Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs. Inc., 893 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th
Cir. 2018).
311. See Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1102 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“When an architect hews closely to existing convention, the architect’s ‘original contribution [is]
slight—his copyright very thin,’ so that only ‘very close copying’ could take whatever truly belongs
to the architect.” (quoting Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2014))).
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‘near identity’ between the works in question to prevail.”312 For instance,
copyright in architectural works covers “the overall form as well as the
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design” but
excludes “individual standard features.”313 “Efficiency is an important
architectural concern[;] [a]ny design elements attributable to building codes,
topography, structures that already exist on the construction site, or
engineering necessity . . . get no protection.”314 The merger doctrine therefore
excludes design features used by all architects to meet market expectations for
homes or commercial buildings.
Similarly, scènes-à-faire, such as
“[n]eoclassical government buildings, colonial houses, and modern high-rise
office buildings are all recognized styles from which architects draw.”315
Although the Lippman study noted “a significant jump” in substantial
similarity opinions involving computer programs after 1980 and peaking in
the early 2000s, computer software cases form an unremarkably small portion
of the dataset for this study.316 The emergence of computer software
accounted for the case bump in 1980,317 a trend also reported in another
empirical copyright study involving fair use.318 Courts treat the programs’
code in computer programs like literary works.319 In addition, courts also treat
computer programs like compilations.320
Like architectural works and software, copyright protection in factual
works is thin and embraces only “the author’s original expression of particular

312. Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
313. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016) (excluding “[s]tandard configurations of spaces,” 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.11(d)(2) (2019) and “common windows, doors, and other staple building components,” H.R.
REP. NO. 101-735, at 18 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949, but including
individual features that “reflect the [a]rchitect’s creativity”).
314. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 105.
315. Id.
316. Lippman, supra note 14, at 535–36.
317. Id. at 536.
318. Beebe, supra note 263, at 566.
319. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 24, at § 8:1 (“One may think of a computer program
as a combination of two works: a literary work consisting of the program’s code, and an audiovisual
work consisting of the pictures and sounds the program generates to the user.”); see Comput. Assocs.
Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (applying the abstraction/filtration/comparison test by
abstracting a list of the elements the defendant copies, filtering out unprotectable elements, and
comparing the elements that are left to determine if the programs are substantially similar).
320. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 24, at § 8:4. (“The arrangement of unprotectable
code modules or commands may be protected as a compilation.”).
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facts and theories already in the public domain.”321 Historical facts and events
are not protected.322 Neither are interpretations of historical events, such as
theories, plots, or explanatory hypotheses.323 Copyright law only protects the
non-fiction author’s selection, coordination, excerpting, modifying, and
arrangement of public domain components.324 To be substantially similar, the
plaintiff needs to show a higher quantity of copying amounting to “verbatim
reproduction or very close paraphrasing.”325 Thus, any author may write
about property law, but no one may write another seventh edition of Property
Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices.326
In sum, earlier debates over the impact of the type of work on plaintiff
outcomes, including those put forth by the Lippman study, deserve
reconsideration. Data from the past decade shows a general homogeneity
across all types of work, and a trend favoring defendants. Plaintiffs seeking
to improve the odds against them would be better off settling a case or finding
a friendlier forum to litigate outside of the United States.
V. REFLECTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS (BEYOND
COPYRIGHT LAW)
This Article’s empirical analysis reveals how standard-less judgments in
individual cases are made in practice. Ambiguity makes it difficult for
attorneys and judges to advise or rule on infringement.327 Manta ominously
warned that “this likely translates into even greater confusion for artists who
have to make decisions as to how to craft their works such as not to
infringe.”328 Fact finders must abstract out copyrightable content and compare

321. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980).
322. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1966).
323. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974, 978–79.
324. See, e.g., id. at 974 (recognizing that “the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow
indeed, embracing no more than the author’s original expression of particular facts and theories
already in the public domain”).
325. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984).
326. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (7th ed.,
2017).
327. See Manta, supra note 230, at 1338 (“[S]ubstantial similarity can become confusing for even
experienced attorneys and judges. . . .”).
328. Id. (“The empirical research casts concerns as to how judges and juries may adjudicate such
situations of artistic uncertainty.”).
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a diverse variety of works of authorship.329 The doctrinal patchwork of rules
superimposed over a factually intensive inquiry produces a morass of unclear
precedent almost by default.330 In theory, protection extends to authors’
expression of their ideas, but not to the ideas themselves.331 In practice,
protection reaches beyond the literal work to works copied only in part or to
works that are substantially similar,332 otherwise “a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations.”333
A. Reclaiming the Jury Trial
When judges must apply confusing concepts, they may also be less
willing to specify what is unprotectable in jury instructions. The case for jury
trials is not just a case of nostalgia. It is a quest for authenticity and accuracy
in adjudication. The right to a trial by jury stretches back to the adoption of
the Constitution of the United States itself.334 Anti-Federalists believed juries
were the best available means to “rein in corrupt or overactive judges.”335 As
seen in Section III.B, judges deem it appropriate to decide on behalf of the
jury when “no reasonable jury” would disagree with them. Professors Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s seminal work for the University of Chicago Jury
Project showed juries were superior in adjudicating disputes involving
complex societal values.336
Returning the responsibility envisioned by Arnstein to the jury has the
benefit of correcting the misapplication of the test the court articulated as a
matter of procedure.337 Arnstein allowed for expert evidence to help the jury
contextualize the reaction of ordinary lay listeners.338 In doing so, the test
329. See supra Section IV.D.
330. See supra Section II.B.
331. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016). See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930) (“[W]e are rather concerned with the line between expression and what is expressed.”).
332. See supra Part II.
333. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
334. Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 22–23 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
335. Id. at 38.
336. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1971).
337. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946) (“Whether . . . defendant
unlawfully appropriated presents, too, an issue of fact . . . . Surely, then, we have an issue of fact
which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine. Indeed, even if there were to be a trial before a judge, it
would be desirable (although not necessary) for him to summon an advisory jury on this question.”).
338. Id. at 473 (“The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to
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compares the defendant’s work to the plaintiff’s creative contribution and
measures the work’s commercial harm to the plaintiff.339 However, it is the
public as represented by the jury, rather than the judge, for whom copyright
and its fruits exist.340
B. Fact-checking Theory
The second takeaway is that empirical research has the virtue of revealing
otherwise hidden and potentially malignant features of the copyright system,
such as substantial similarity’s silent death and the likely culprits responsible
for its death, while exonerating irrelevant factors such as the type of work at
issue and allegations of willful infringement.
Evidence-based scholarship also pierces through cogent-sounding
theoretical claims that may sound snazzy but have little real-world truth. For
instance, Manta argued that decisions involving substantial similarity may be
plagued by cognitive bias.341 Manta argues that since the scope of a copyright
work is always decided after defendants copy it, a finding of actual copying
tends to hurt the defendant’s case.342 In theory, “a legal decisionmaker may
draw conscious or subconscious conclusions from a determination of copying,
which will increase the chance that he or she will make a finding of substantial
similarity.”343 In practice, this Article has shown that factors such as pretrial
motions and the lack of rivalry play a far more determinative role in case
outcomes.344
Conversely, empirical data can also validate a theory. Manta argues that
the musical excellence of plaintiff’s or defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the issue of
misappropriation; for the views of such persons are caviar to the general—and plaintiff’s and
defendant’s compositions are not caviar.”).
339. See id. (“The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music
is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”).
340. See Ginsburg, supra note 264, at 992 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution’s copyright clause . . . makes
the public’s interest equal, if not superior, to the author’s.”).
341. See, e.g., Manta, supra note 230, at 1305, 1339 (pointing out the cognitive biases inevitably
present in tests like the reasonable man test and other vague legal tests such as substantial similarity
in copyright law).
342. Id. at 1340 (“[I]t appears that hindsight bias will result in pro plaintiff effects.”); see, e.g.,
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1631
(2009) (“[H]indsight bias is indeed an inevitable consequence of any ex post liability and entitlement
delineation process.”).
343. Manta, supra note 230, at 1340.
344. See supra Sections IV.A–C.
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the overconfidence effect, “[o]ne of the most robust findings in the literature
on individual decision making,”345 is amplified by ambiguous rules such as
those found in substantial similarity.346 Manta observed that “judges view
themselves as good or at least decent decisionmakers in the copyright context
and that their ability to view directly the most relevant evidence leaves little
room for second-guessing their skill level for making definitive
judgments.”347 Manta’s observation may explain judges’ willingness to
accept defendants’ invitations to rule on their pretrial motions while paying
lip service to the need for jury input as seen in Section IV.B.
Finally, the convergence of theory and data can reveal new areas
demanding more theorization and empirical work. For instance, Manta
argued that courts may use the original work as a cognitive anchor, over-focus
on similarities, “and gravitate toward a finding of liability, which again favors
plaintiffs.”348 Similarly, she observed that copyright plaintiffs may benefit
from an “irrational primacy effect” for simply having presented their case first
as in theory it may create a confirmation bias in the mind of the court.349 Both
of these are valuable questions that future empirical studies on substantial
similarity can help answer.
C. Cross-fertilization
The final takeaway is that stakeholders must be willing to look at
doctrines both within copyright law and beyond to crack the substantial
similarity code and respond meaningfully to this report of its silent death.
Judging substantial similarity can be daunting because the fact finder must
distinguish copyrightable expression from unprotected factual description
without the linguistic aids like those found in patent claims.350 Unlike patent
law, which relies on a skilled person in the art, and trademark law, which relies
on the perception of consumers, copyright law’s substantial similarity test

345. Manta, supra note 230, at 1344 (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A
Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139 (1997)).
346. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 219 (1993).
347. Manta, supra note 230, at 1345.
348. Manta, supra note 230, at 1341–42.
349. Id. at 1342.
350. See supra Part I.
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uses a hybrid standard that draws on both expert and nonexpert observers.351
Professor Rebecca Tushnet observed that “whether copyright owners
would increase their output if given rights over certain uses is often resolved
by normative decisions about appropriate markets that they ought to control,
rather than by any evidence that derivative markets affect incentives.”352 A
good first step is a compelling narrative showing how harm from
noncompeting uses can create market foreclosure instead of actual damage
that copying causes to the plaintiff’s market.
Here, scholars can help courts and litigants develop substantial similarity
jurisprudence using fair use concepts.353 Fair use regards kindly defendants
who reuse the plaintiff’s work in a transformative manner. An area of
copyright that is ripe for the application of fair use is works that courts have
already tended to view as “fair,” such as parodies and uses that infuse the
original work with new meaning; use of the plaintiff’s work in news reports;
use in historical research; and use in comparative advertising.354 These classes
of works do not compete with the copyrighted work and promote culture and
knowledge.355
To some degree, every creator uses preexisting material others created.
Copyright law’s utilitarianism means that the law sides with plaintiffs only as
far as it is necessary for the advancement of knowledge and learning.356 While
plagiarists might be condemned, as an anecdotal matter, courts employing
both fair use and substantial similarity have been much more forgiving to non-

351. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1273 (2014). “[U]nlike trademark and patent law, copyright does assess
infringement using a hybrid of technical similarity and market substitution from the vantage point of
both the consumer and the expert.” Id. at 1299.
352. Rebecca Tushnet, Unfair Competition and Uncommon Sense, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 17, 21
(2009).
353. See Fromer & Lemley, supra, note 351, at 1301 (“Copyright’s hybrid audience, then, is
intimately related not only to its infringement analysis but also to the fair-use doctrine.”).
354. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2544–46 (2009).
355. See e.g., Fromer & Lemley, supra note 351, at 1301.
356. See Fromer, supra note 277, at 76 (“[E]xclusive rights in intellectual property can prevent
competition in protected works, thereby allowing the rightsholder to charge a premium for access and
ultimately limiting these valuable works’ diffusion to society at large. For another, given that
knowledge is frequently cumulative, society benefits when subsequent creators are not prevented from
building on previous artistic creations to generate new works.”); see also Loren, supra note 270, at
1352 (“[A]s a law that is designed to provide an incentive for artists to invest their time and talent in
the creation of new works, and as a law that exists in a capitalistic economy, a focus in copyright on
monetary effects of the use of another’s expression is understandable.”).
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rivals who use copyrighted work in order to produce their own work the same
way. When rivals copy, they may infringe due to improper appropriation. In
contrast, non-rivals are more likely to fulfill the constitutional directive and
be proper.
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal set out when judges ought to be willing to accept, infer, or presume
causality.357 The touchstone is plausibility.358 Plaintiffs need to go beyond
conclusory allegations of likely harm and focus on marketplace substitution
as well as qualitative and quantitative misappropriation, guided by the fair use
rubric. As fair use becomes more coherent, so will substantial similarity. As
substantial similarity becomes more coherent, so will fair use.359
VI. CONCLUSION
Substantial similarity is often a complicated inquiry requiring courts to
assess whether the defendant’s work uses enough material from the plaintiff’s
work. The debate has divided courts and scholars, principally over the
appropriate test to apply to find nonliteral copyright infringement and,
relatedly, the impact of variations in forum and type of work on what the test
should look like. This Article argues that this debate distracts from a far more
significant reality—the demise of substantial similarity, the key reasons for it,
and the factors which are irrelevant.
This Article reports that modern plaintiffs face an astonishingly low win
rate—low when compared to rates since 1923 and low when compared to
those in nonliteral patent infringement. Neither the tests courts apply nor the
circuits they reside in adequately account for this finding. Instead, this Article
identifies two factors. First, judges and defendants use pretrial motions to ride
roughshod over the factual inquiry component of substantial similarity tests
reserved for juries. Second, many cases involve non-rival defendants, and
like fair use, courts may regard them as promoting rather than stifling
copyright’s utilitarian policies, and as a strict liability tort, courts are
unswayed even by allegations of willful infringement. Earlier debates over
357. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007).
358. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”).
359. See Balganesh, supra note 14 at 271.
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the impact of the type of work on plaintiff outcomes deserve reconsideration.
There is a general homogeneity across all types of work, and a trend favoring
defendants.
A better understanding of substantial similarity would serve two
immediate purposes. First, the empirical findings give policymakers, courts,
and scholars an evidence-based framework to ensure fidelity to copyright
policy and to chart its future. The American economy rests at a transcendent
and transformative inflection point in its history, and the vitality of the
substantial similarity doctrine forms an important part of it. If plaintiffs are
hobbling along with emaciated rights, stakeholders should know about it and
act accordingly.
Second, these findings help develop a framework to better understand the
contours of copyright infringement and other areas of the law. The
conclusions in this Article inevitably introduce new questions for future study.
The most important question is whether judges—almost exclusively—should
continue to judge copyright cases. Defendants appear to benefit significantly
from this trend, though whether there may be other nonobvious factors would
be worth studying further.
Results from this Article also provide a platform for studies on several
other important issues, including how fair use and substantial similarity
jurisprudence inform each other; whether and how case outcomes outside the
United States on attributes such as the type of work at issue and posture affect
case outcomes; whether the Supreme Court should implement a uniform test
even if the results of the diverse tests appear similar; whether the Priest-Klein
hypothesis influences substantial similarity cases more than other types of
cases, and if so, why. As the commentary and cases on substantial similarity
informed the key findings in this article, those findings will provide steps to
better understanding of where we are in the law, and what we may need to fix.
And that is as it should be.
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